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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is a numbers game. Policymaking, public perception, and the
scholarly literature are captivated with the number of annual bankruptcy filings,
which hit one million in 2008.1 The number of annual bankruptcy filings has
become a barometer of economic health, reflecting an implicit assumption that
bankruptcy is a useful proxy for financial distress.
But at the level of the individual family, the causative relation between
financial distress and bankruptcy filings is unclear. On the one hand, only a
fraction of those in serious financial distress will ever file for bankruptcy. For
example, a study by Michelle White examined a group of households in which
bankruptcy relief would have afforded an economic benefit to about 15% of
them, but only about 0.66–1% sought relief any given year.2 That is, most
families in serious financial distress do not file for bankruptcy. In fact, each year
foreclosure filings outstrip bankruptcy filings because many families do not
even try to use bankruptcy to save their homes.3 Similarly, thousands of families
are subject to collection calls for medical bills,4 and yet the number of bank-
ruptcy filings—even at its pinnacle—represents only a sliver of those struggling
with bills. On the other hand, we know that many families that file for
bankruptcy are so mired in poverty—with no substantial income or assets—that
they gain little obvious financial advantage.5 Those families discharge debts that
1. The premise of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)
was that the number of bankruptcy filings in the 1990s and first years of the 2000s was unacceptably
high. Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 351–52 (2008). Although filings dropped immediately after BAPCPA’s
effective date and remain lower than the all-time high, the number of filings has been trending steadily
upward for several years now. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#quarterly (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
2. See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
205, 206 (1998).
3. For example, the Mortgage Bankers Association reports that about 4,590,000 foreclosures were
initiated during the fourth quarter of 2008. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY
SURVEY: Q408 (Mar. 2009) (copy on file with authors). During that same quarter, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts reported 236,982 nonbusiness bankruptcy filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, QUARTERLY FILINGS: MARCH 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#
quarterly.
4. See ANDREW COHEN & CAROL PRYOR, IN DEBT BUT NOT INDIFFERENT: CHAPTER 58 AND THE ACCESS
PROJECT’S MEDICAL DEBT RESOLUTION PROGRAM 21 (2008), available at http://www.accessproject.org/
adobe/InDebtButNotIndifferent.pdf; MARK RUKAVINA, HEARING ON WORKING FAMILIES IN FINANCIAL
CRISIS: MEDICAL DEBT BANKRUPTCY 4 (2007) (report of Mark Rukavina, Executive Director of The
Access Project, submitted to the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary), available at www.accessproject.org/adobe/rukavina_testimony_
July_2007.pdf.
5. In the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project sample, 95.1% of the 1612 Chapter 7 cases were
denominated on the debtors’ petitions as “no-asset” cases. See 2007 CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, SURVEY
DATA (on file with Katherine Porter); see also Ed Flynn et al., Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Chapter 7
Asset Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2002–Jan. 2003, at 22 (reporting, based on June 2001–June 2002
filings, that 96% of Chapter 7 cases are closed without any funds collected and distributed to creditors).
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creditors could not have collected in any event.6 These additional, and presump-
tively unnecessary, bankruptcies drive up the number of filings.
The equating of bankruptcy with financial distress misperceives the social
and economic significance of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not the cause of
financial distress; it is our institutional remedy for it. Thus, a central policy
question is how to design a bankruptcy system so that it minimizes the societal
costs of financial distress. Understanding why particular households seek relief
in bankruptcy at particular times is the central empirical question for an
intelligent assessment of that problem. Policymakers concerned about the role
of bankruptcy in giving families a fresh start that redeploys their human capital
to productive use should wonder whether the existing process, so loosely related
to the severity of financial distress, is sorting the right families into bankruptcy
at the right time. The social costs of financial distress, discussed more thor-
oughly in Part I, are too high if the system either attracts families who could
repay their debts or hinders those for whom repayment will never be a realistic
option. Intuitively, it seems obvious that there must be something that distin-
guishes the distressed families who choose bankruptcy from those who do not.
Yet without an understanding of the mechanisms that motivate those in distress
to seek bankruptcy relief, aggregate level data about the annual number of
bankruptcy filings are of little value in assessing those questions.
This Article looks beneath the raw bankruptcy numbers and examines the
mystery of why so few of the consumers for whom bankruptcy would be
economically valuable actually choose to file. What prompts the few who seek
bankruptcy relief at any given moment to separate themselves from the mass
who do not? Is it too many calls from a debt collector? Is it the threatened loss
of a home to foreclosure or an imminent wage garnishment? Scant research
exists about such effects and how they contribute to a family’s decision to file
for bankruptcy. The focus on the rising tide of bankruptcy filings has obscured
our collective understanding of what triggers a distressed consumer’s decision
to seek bankruptcy relief.
This project is a first effort to examine that problem. Specifically, we want to
explore what leads consumers in financial distress to file for bankruptcy at the
particular moment they choose to do so. Because our goal is to improve the way
in which the bankruptcy system responds to financial distress, our research is
agnostic regarding the nature of the underlying causes of household financial
distress. We are focused directly on the last straw, the “trigger” that drives
families into the bankruptcy system at any given instant.
6. The relevant class of families is not those without any assets at all, but those whose assets are
exempt from execution under applicable state law and thus cannot be taken by a creditor through
coercive process to satisfy a judgment. Although those exemptions vary considerably from state to
state, they often are sufficiently expansive to cover substantially all of the assets of a typical bankrupt
family. See ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 267–94 (Supp. 2006) (summarizing each state’s
exemption laws); see generally 14 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(15th ed. 2008) (describing variations in state exemption laws).
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Starting from the paradigms of bankruptcies driven by an imminent mortgage
foreclosure or garnishment, our working hypothesis was that entry into the legal
process for the ordinary consumer is an unfamiliar, intimidating, and serious
step, and that debt burdens alone are rarely adequate to force a bankruptcy.
Thus, we speculated, the typical consumer would seek formal debt relief through the
bankruptcy system only when a creditor took some formal collection action that
required a bankruptcy filing to stave off financial disaster for the household. Our
expectation was that information about collection activities would explain how
families are sorted into those who continue to struggle along with their debts
and those who seek relief in bankruptcy.
To examine that theory, we combine three kinds of data. The first source is
quantitative data collected from judicial records that show the weekly, monthly,
and annual patterns of bankruptcy filings. The second is a series of more than
forty interviews with industry professionals (debtor and creditor attorneys,
trustees, and judges), predominantly from five states (Georgia, Iowa, Massachu-
setts, Nevada, and Texas). Those interviews examine why people file when they
do and what distinguishes those who choose to file from those who delay or
avoid filing. The third source is survey data from the 2007 Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project, the first nationally representative sample of bankrupt house-
holds. The survey data explore the struggles families endure before they choose
to file.
The data support two empirical findings. The first is about the role of
aggressive collection in motivating bankruptcy filings. Generally, apart from
foreclosure-related filings, the emergency bankruptcy filing is largely a myth.
Creditor collection activity does not force people into an immediate bankruptcy.
On the contrary, it wears them down slowly but ineluctably, like water dripping
on a stone. Second, the primary factor that affects the date on which people
actually file is their ability to save up the money to pay their attorneys and filing
fees. Thus, among other things, we see an annual peak in bankruptcies shortly
after families receive their tax refunds and a semimonthly peak related to the
receipt of paychecks.
Finally, we build two important policy recommendations on those findings.
First, we argue that the existing collection process is flawed by a prisoner’s
dilemma that leads to excessive and wasteful “dunning” by creditors. Because
each creditor has an incentive to be first in line to collect, and because the
creditors can dun their debtors at little or no cost to themselves, creditors as a
group engage in dunning activities that individual debtors find intolerable—a
level of activities from which a rational single creditor would refrain. We
recommend a variety of improvements to strengthen the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. Some of these recommendations are detailed (extending the Act
to in-house collection, increasing the statutory damages, and the like), but the
most important innovation is a “do-not-dun” rule modeled on the do-not-call list
for telemarketers. Specifically, we recommend a low-transaction-cost mecha-
nism (activated by telephone call or Internet site) that would automatically and
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immediately stop all creditor collection activity other than litigation, at least for
a fixed period of time. This mechanism would prevent the harms of excessive
calls and letters to debtors who have signaled they will not pay voluntarily; if
the creditors believe those debtors can pay, then they should move forward with
litigation.
Second, corollary to our argument that excessive collection causes inappropri-
ate bankruptcy filings, we also believe that excessive costs deter socially valu-
able bankruptcies. To respond to that problem, building on earlier work, we
argue that low-income, low-asset filers should have access to a simplified ad-
ministrative process that provides prompt relief without the costs and delay of
judicial process.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the gap between the ample
research on the underlying causes of financial distress and the scant research on
the triggers of bankruptcy filing. Part II describes the methodology of our data
collection and its relative strengths and weaknesses. Part III presents our
qualitative and survey-based findings about the interplay between collection
efforts and the urgency of bankruptcy filings. Part IV examines the lag between
a consumer’s initial decision to seek bankruptcy relief and the ultimate filing of
the bankruptcy case, illustrating how debtors’ constrained access to ready cash
shapes the patterns of bankruptcies. And finally, Part V analyzes the implica-
tions of our findings for existing policy debates about both debt collection and
the gatekeeping function of the bankruptcy process.
I. THEORIES OF BANKRUPTCY
Conventional theories of bankruptcy shed little light on the bankruptcy
decision on which this Article focuses. The central concern of those theories is
resolving the “moral hazard” problem inherent in a system in which borrowers
receive loans at one point in time and promise to repay them at a later time.
Early writers in that tradition argued that rules permitting borrowers to display
their repayment proclivities by accepting contracts with such remedies as
“arm-breaking” would result in stronger markets that prevented borrowers from
succumbing to moral hazard.7 Scholars applying that model to the bankruptcy
discharge suggest that an optimal market would resolve the moral hazard
problem by permitting consumer bankrupts to waive their bankruptcy remedies
by contract.8
Similarly, Michelle White suggests that exemption laws that preserve a
substantial asset base for consumer bankrupts will give consumers incentives to
file for bankruptcy without adequate financial distress to justify the discharge
7. See Richard Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 159–62 (2004);
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit, and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 188,
193 & n.13 (1984).
8. See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 609–10 (2000).
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that they will receive.9 More generally, writers in the populist vein emphasize
the possibility that a loosening of the rigors of bankruptcy might lead to
opportunistic borrowing. Thus, they contend that consumers often borrow
because they know that bankruptcy will forgive their obligation to repay the
loan.10
A contrary perspective in existing scholarship looks not to individuals’
strategic options, but has emphasized the importance of exogenous financial
shock in the etiology of consumer bankruptcy. This perspective attributes a
large share of consumer bankruptcy filings to uncontrollable events like layoffs,
illness, or divorce. For example, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook’s study of
1991 consumer bankruptcy filings reports job-related disruptions in more than
two-thirds of filings,11 divorces in almost a quarter of bankrupt households (a
rate more than twice the national average),12 and medical reasons for almost
one-fifth of bankruptcies.13 A recent study suggests that medical problems
contribute to a larger share of bankruptcies than the 1991 data suggest.14
More recent work has considered how the structure and nature of households
may heighten the risk of exogenous shock and bankruptcy. In their book, The
Two-Income Trap, Warren and Tyagi find that married couples with children are
more than twice as likely to seek bankruptcy relief than are childless couples
and contend that two-income families with children have ratcheted up their risk
of financial collapse by eliminating the traditional option of deploying a mother
into the work force to cope with an exogenous shock.15 Such household
decisions may seem remote, or even intuitively counter to financial risk, but
both married and single people with children are overrepresented among bank-
ruptcy debtors.16
The fundamental weakness of those models, however, is that they equate
financial distress with bankruptcy. The implicit premise is that bankruptcy is an
adequate proxy for financial distress: if some combination of profligate borrow-
ing and exogenous shocks leads to debts that overwhelm a family’s financial
9. White, supra note 2, at 229; see Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical
Look at Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Laws and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685,
708–09 (1998).
10. See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 206;
Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463,
1526 (2005).
11. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 77–79 (2000).
12. Id. at 183.
13. Id. at 145–46.
14. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Feb. 2, 2005, at 63, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.63/
DC1.
15. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 6 (2003).
16. See id. (reporting that married couples with children are more than twice as likely to file
bankruptcy as childless couples and that an unmarried woman with children is nearly three times as
likely to file for bankruptcy as a woman without children).
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resources, the result is financial distress, upon which bankruptcy follows inexo-
rably. The primary implication of that premise is that research about overindebt-
edness or the quality of the social safety net can use data about bankruptcy
filings to quantify the incidence of financial distress. The two sides of the debate
differ on the relevance of profligacy and exogenous shock, but they share a
disinterest in distinguishing between financial distress that does, and does not,
result in bankruptcy. Figure 1 illustrates that conventional view.
In practice, however, a strong majority of those in serious financial distress
does not file for bankruptcy. This raises the question of whether, among the
population of financially distressed consumers, those who do file for bankruptcy
differ in any important way from those who do not file for bankruptcy. Figure 2
illustrates a new model, focusing on the distinction between those who choose
to use the bankruptcy process and those who do not remediate their financial
distress by filing for bankruptcy.
This revised model can provide important insights if we view the purpose of
a bankruptcy system as balancing the benefits of prompt redeployment of
human capital against the excessive moral hazard of an unduly lax system for
the enforcement of debts. The principal basis for social concern about financial
Figure 1. Conventional Models of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress
Figure 2. Revised Model of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress
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distress is its adverse effect on the social productivity of the affected house-
holds. It is reasonable to expect that households in distress will engage in less of
the fruitful economic activity characteristic of productive households, activity
that benefits the surrounding community in various ways, ranging from tax
payments to consumption expenditures (supporting economic growth) to employ-
ment (supporting yet another round of economic activity). More generally,
households in distress are less likely to invest appropriately in health and
education for their members and are more likely to be involved in divorce and
similar processes.17 An optimal process for the resolution of financial distress
would minimize the amount of those social losses. Among other things, those
losses can be minimized by a process that limits the time and expense consumed
by the period of distress and returns the household to productive economic
activity. The model illustrated in Figure 2 brings to the forefront the question of
whether the sorting of distressed households into bankruptcy and nonbank-
ruptcy responses reflects an optimal balancing of those social policies.
Relatively little empirical evidence addresses this question, primarily because
of the difficulty of collecting data about distressed households that do not use
the bankruptcy system to address their problems. Normally, legal scholars
examine bankruptcy because it is an easy place to find data. A few papers in
recent years have used data sets of distressed private firms in an effort to
understand the differences between those that do and do not use the bankruptcy
process when they fail.18 In the consumer context, however, scholars have not
yet undertaken such a study.
That is not to say that there is no evidence in the literature on the patterns and
specific causes of bankruptcy filings. For example, we know from Stanley and
Girth’s landmark study under the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act that threats of legal
action were frequent triggers of bankruptcy filings during the 1960s.19 However,
actual legal actions, such as garnishments, were less commonly named by
debtors as an immediate cause of their bankruptcy filings.20 Herbert Jacob’s
study of households in the 1960s subjected to wage garnishment in four
17. Cf. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD
MARKETS 49–51 (2006) (stating that financial distress imposes “substantial costs on third parties,”
including externalities such as a decline in the mental and physical health of family members).
18. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of Failed High-
Tech Firms, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1375, 1377–79 (2004); Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around
Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law (The Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Columbia
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 320, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id1065543.
19. See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47 (1971)
(reporting threats of legal action as immediate cause for filing in 43% of personal bankruptcy cases).
20. See id. at 48 (finding that 18% of debtors named actual legal action as reason why they filed
bankruptcy). Richard Hynes’s recent study of garnishment suggests that the role of garnishment may
have declined considerably since the 1960s. See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections:
The Case of the Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 626–30 (2006) (reporting that
although bankruptcy rates have risen over a period of a dozen or more years, garnishment rates declined
in Cook County, Illinois and remained flat in the Commonwealth of Virginia).
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Wisconsin cities rejected the premise of a close link between the incidence of
wage garnishment and bankruptcy, noting that only two-fifths of bankruptcy
debtors had been subjected to garnishment before filing.21 Notably, bankruptcy
debtors reported creditor harassment or pressure more frequently than other
delinquent debtors who did not file for bankruptcy; the study’s author concluded
that for most bankruptcy debtors, “the collector was constantly present and a
source of continuous concern.”22
Similarly, Martin Ryan’s study of the Australian process identified a substan-
tial relationship between creditor harassment and bankruptcy.23 Although there
are some significant differences, Australia is a useful comparison because it has
a developed credit economy and relatively generous bankruptcy relief. Ryan found
that approximately half (52%) of Australian bankrupts had received threats of
legal action24 and that 59% of them reported that pressure from creditors had a
“crucial” or “significant” effect on their decision to petition for bankruptcy
relief.25 Ryan delved deeply into this relationship, finding that stronger percep-
tions about creditor pressure were associated with the frequency of creditor
contact and the length of time the debtor was under collection pressure.26
Apart from, or in addition to, these effects from collection pressures, timing
could affect bankruptcy filings. For two decades, the shared wisdom was that
consumer filings surged after Christmas and in the late summer. Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook report that bankruptcy court clerks and lawyers at-
tributed the former to the arrival of holiday bills in January and the latter to
“an analogous back-to-school ‘rush’ in late August.”27 Ultimately, they deem
seasonality to be “putative” and suggest any such effects are stronger for fil-
ings in Chapter 7, which provides a rapid discharge, than Chapter 13 filings, in
which debtors repay a portion of their debts over a period of years.28 In a later
study from 1991, they found little seasonality across months in Texas and
California.29
Electronic filing technology and computerized record keeping allow us to test
these dated conclusions with a more comprehensive and nuanced examination
of filing patterns than these earlier efforts. More generally, a thorough understand-
ing of the process requires an understanding not only of the filing patterns but
also of their relation to the creditor collection efforts that precede them. As this
discussion makes clear, however, there has been no sustained effort to examine
21. HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT: THE CONSUMPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES 56–57 (1969).
22. Id. at 64.
23. See MARTIN RYAN, THE LAST RESORT: A STUDY OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTS 153 (1995).
24. Id. at 145.
25. Id. at 153–54.
26. Id. at 161.
27. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN
AMERICA 344–45 (1989).
28. Id. at 354 n.1.
29. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of
Consumer Bankrupts 1981–1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 148 (1994).
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those subjects during the three decades since enactment of the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978. This project provides a first step toward understanding that process.
II. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methodology of our data collection, the problems
we faced in designing our data collection, and the solutions we used to respond
to those problems. We began our inquiry by collecting data on filing patterns in
five states. We then conducted interviews with bankruptcy professionals to
contextualize those patterns. We added data from a national survey of bank-
ruptcy debtors to examine how consumers themselves explain the triggers for
their bankruptcies.
A. SELECTING JURISDICTIONS
Our goal in selecting jurisdictions for our study was to balance the need to
keep the size of the project manageable against the obvious variations among
the states in both economic and legal conditions and in bankruptcy filing rates.
Ultimately, we settled on five states designed to reflect diversity on several
different metrics: Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Texas.
To begin with, the states are geographically and culturally distinct: Massa-
chusetts is in the heart of New England; Georgia and Texas are at polar ends
of the South; Iowa is in the Midwest; and Nevada is in the far Southwest. With
respect to foreclosure and bankruptcy attributes, Iowa requires judicial pro-
ceedings for foreclosure, while Texas, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Nevada
permit nonjudicial foreclosure but have significantly different procedural re-
quirements that affect the time needed to foreclose.30 The states that permit
nonjudicial foreclosure have high rates of foreclosures per capita.31 The
amount and type of assets that a party may shield from creditors also varies
in these states. Nevada and Texas permit very generous exemptions, Iowa
has moderate exemptions, and Georgia and Massachusetts are relatively par-
simonious.32
30. For example, in Massachusetts, mortgagees typically file a complaint as an initial step to obtain a
judgment that the mortgagor is not subject to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, which provides
additional debtor protections to military personnel. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 532–33 (2009). This pro-
cedural step in Massachusetts Land Court, see MASS. LAND CT. R. 12, adds a delay of several weeks to
the nonjudicial process that follows.
31. The foreclosures per capita rankings for the five states are: Georgia (second); Massachusetts
(third); Nevada (fourth); Texas (seventh); and Iowa (twenty-fourth). The information in this paragraph
relies on population estimates from the Census Bureau, foreclosure data from the Mortgage Bankers
Association, and bankruptcy filing rates from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, all as of
2007 (the latest data available when we selected the jurisdictions for our study).
32. See HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUTPCY LAW AND PRACTICE app. J (Supp. 2008)
(summarizing each state’s exemption laws).
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These states also exhibit considerable diversity in bankruptcy filing rates.
With regard to total bankruptcy filings, Georgia (third) is near the top. But
Nevada (fifteenth) and Iowa (twenty-ninth) are in the middle tier, and Texas
(thirty-fifth) and Massachusetts (fortieth) are closer to the bottom. The relative
fraction of cases that are Chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcies or Chapter 13
(repayment) bankruptcies also varies considerably among these states. Chapter
13 filing rates per capita show this effect, ranging from Georgia yet again at the
top of the scale (third), to Texas (fifteenth), Nevada (twentieth), and Massachu-
setts (thirty-first) in the middle, to Iowa near the bottom (forty-eighth).33
B. QUANTITATIVE FILING DATA
Next, we collected data from the public court records on the number of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings for each day during 2004 and 2007
for our five jurisdictions.34 We excluded 2005 and 2006 because of the abnor-
mal pattern of filings during those years attributable to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) in
2005.35 Thus, the two years for which we collected data are the two most recent,
representative years for which complete data were available, and to the extent
possible, this should isolate the effects of BAPCPA on the questions that we
examine. We used the filings-per-day data to generate figures for each jurisdic-
tion showing the patterns of filings by day of the week, day of the month, week
of the year, and month of the year.
The quantitative data would have obvious problems if we intended to use
them as a basis for drawing inferences about the reasons that particular individu-
als file at particular times. For one thing, the data are state-level aggregate
data.36 For another, we have only cross-sectional data rather than a longitudinal
series. Finally, because there is good reason to expect variation from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, the limitation of the data collection to particular jurisdictions
renders generalizations from the data problematic. Thus, our principal uses of
the data were as a basis for generating questions for the qualitative interviews
described below and for examining how variations in state collection processes
affect decisions to file for bankruptcy.
33. See supra note 31. We calculated these ourselves, specifically using the bankruptcy filing rates
from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
34. To collect the court-record data, we used the PACER service of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts and received data collected from those public records from a private company, AACER,
which generously provided us with assistance. Although we are primarily interested in consumer
filings, we did not distinguish between business and nonbusiness filings because the share of filings by
individuals is such a high share of overall filings in the jurisdictions we examined that business filings
are a trivial share of total filings.
35. For a preliminary discussion of the effects of BAPCPA on filing rates, see Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 397–401.
36. Although we collected the data by aggregating PACER records of individual filings, we analyzed
the data only at the level of state jurisdictions. None of our hypotheses suggests important variations at
levels below the state level.
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C. SURVEY DATA
As a second source of data regarding our hypotheses, we turned to the 2007
Consumer Bankruptcy Project.37 Its data come from the first nationwide
random sample of households in bankruptcy, providing us with a wide lens for
studying recent consumer filings. The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project is the
largest and most comprehensive family-level study of bankruptcy debtors to
date.38
With the generous help of the Automated Access to Court Electronic Records
(AACER),39 the Consumer Bankruptcy Project drew a random sample of one
thousand Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcies filed by natural persons (rather
than legal entities) for five consecutive weeks beginning the last week of
January 2007.40 Investigators mailed each of these five thousand households
a letter explaining the study, a written questionnaire, a prepaid response en-
velope, and two dollars cash as a token of appreciation. Debtors were asked
to return the questionnaire if they wished to participate. The investigators sent
follow-up reminders in the weeks that followed. These efforts produced 2438
questionnaires, yielding a participation rate of 49.0%.41 Of these returned
questionnaires, 2314 were completed; the remaining 124 were returned incom-
plete.
The sample of 2438 returned questionnaires closely mirrored the universe of
bankruptcy filings. For 2007, AACER data show that 29% of bankruptcy cases
were joint cases. In the respondent sample, joint petitions were 29.9% of the
cases. In the time period that corresponded to the sampling, 62.3% of all
nonbusiness bankruptcies were Chapter 7 cases, and 37.7% were Chapter 13
cases. In the respondent sample, 66% of respondents had filed Chapter 7 cases,
and 34% had filed Chapter 13 cases. To assess response bias, investigators
downloaded court records for a sample of nonrespondents to determine whether
the nonrespondents were statistically distinguishable from those who responded.
According to the criteria available from the court records such as income,
assets, debt, home value, and history of prior bankruptcy, investigators did not
37. The research team includes law professors, sociologists, and medical doctors. Katherine Porter is
one of the investigators in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project.
38. For a detailed discussion of the methodology of the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, see
Lawless et al., supra note 1, at 391–97.
39. AACER is a provider of bankruptcy data. AACER Home Page, http://www.aacer.com (last
visited Nov. 24, 2009).
40. The choice to sample in the first quarter of 2007 was difficult because it is impossible to discern
precisely when the immediate effects from the enactment of BAPCPA had diminished and a new
“normal” pattern of filings had been reached. Of course, we now know that a more recent sample would
have risked contamination by the unusually adverse economic conditions of the ensuing season.
41. A few hundred questionnaires were returned as undeliverable. Investigators drew another
random sample to replace these households and repeated the same procedures used for the initial
sample. An additional eighty-three households responded to the questionnaire by affirmatively refusing
to participate. Thus, responses were received (whether returned completed, returned incomplete, or
refused via phone or letter) from 2521 households, an overall response rate of 50.7%.
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detect significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents.42
To unpack the pressures that may have caused people in financial distress to seek
bankruptcy relief, we used Consumer Bankruptcy Project data from two research
instruments: written questionnaires and computer-assisted telephone interviews.43 The
eight-page questionnaire was mailed to debtors shortly after their bankruptcy filings
and focused on demographic information and self-reported causes of bankruptcy. The
questionnaires asked debtors if they were willing to participate in a follow-up tele-
phone interview in return for fifty dollars compensation. A high proportion (86.7%) of
respondents affirmed an interest.
A small team of trained researchers used computer-assisted technology to
interview debtors six to twelve months after the respondent’s bankruptcy filing.
Interviews were completed with 1032 respondents, which is 51.4% of those
who indicated a willingness to be interviewed and 42.3% of those who returned
questionnaires. To minimize the consequences of the fact that some debtors
were easier to reach, repeated efforts were made to contact each debtor who
was willing to be interviewed. To test for possible response bias, investigators
compared the group of completed interview subjects with the group of volun-
teers who were not ultimately interviewed according to several economic
criteria; investigators identified no significant differences between the two
groups.44
For this project, we used data from the general questions asked of all in-
terview subjects.45 Broadly speaking, questions in the general section addressed
the following issues: prebankruptcy financial pressures, employment, types of
debt, effects of indebtedness, privations before bankruptcy, and financial circum-
stances after bankruptcy. The median length of the interviews was seventy-five
minutes.
D. QUALITATIVE DATA
The ultimate purpose of our project is to understand the triggering events that
sort those few individuals who file for bankruptcy from the much larger number
of individuals in financial distress. Because so little is known about the subject,
it is difficult to develop crisp, testable hypotheses, and hence, a qualitative
research strategy seemed the approach most likely to be practicable and yield
fruitful insights. Ideally, we would have interviewed a random sample from
42. This does not prove that the sample is void of response bias. Respondents and nonrespondents
may have differed, for example, on criteria such as race or existence of health insurance, which are not
available from the public court records and thus cannot be obtained for nonrespondents.
43. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project also coded hundreds of pieces of data from each debtor’s
bankruptcy court records, which were matched on a debtor-by-debtor basis with the questionnaire and
telephone interview data.
44. For further details on the telephone interview methodology, see Lawless et al., supra note 1, at
396–97 & n.177.
45. The telephone interviews comprised up to five sections: general, medical, housing, small
business, and military, depending on whether the debtor met eligibility criteria such as owning a home
or having performed military service.
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the population of those who file for bankruptcy and from the population of
individuals in similar situations of financial distress who do not file. In practice,
however, it is not practicable to identify the population of individuals who are
similarly situated to bankruptcy debtors but choose not to file. There is simply
no access point to the population of those in financial distress paralleling the
public availability of data about bankruptcy debtors.
Accordingly, we decided to interview bankruptcy professionals, expecting
that bankruptcy professionals who interact closely with those considering bank-
ruptcy would have information about the motivations of those who do and do
not file for bankruptcy. The hope was that combining the Consumer Bankruptcy
Project survey data from bankruptcy debtors with a series of in-depth interviews
with bankruptcy professionals would provide a richer picture of the triggers for
bankruptcy filings.
We conducted a series of interviews with bankruptcy judges, trustees, and
debtors’ and creditors’ attorneys. Unfortunately, even within those defined groups, we
cannot be certain that we obtained a representative set of interviews. Although
the population of bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy trustees is readily identifi-
able, their professional responsibilities do not require the level of sustained
interaction with consumers in financial distress that characterizes the daily work
of debtors’ and creditors’ attorneys. Moreover, because they interact only with
those who actually file for bankruptcy and not the larger group of those in
financial distress who may consider bankruptcy or be in financial distress (but
do not ultimately file), judges and trustees are less useful as interview subjects
for this project.
With respect to bankruptcy attorneys, the difficulty lies both in identifying the
relevant population and in obtaining access for interviews. Ultimately, we
attempted a combination of chain-referral sampling and targeted sampling.46
Specifically, we started in each jurisdiction with preexisting contacts with bank-
ruptcy trustees and judges. We then used referrals from the trustees and judges
as a way to gain access for interviews with bankruptcy attorneys. Separately,
using contacts at the national level, we attempted to locate for each jurisdiction
some of the most prominent collection attorneys and the most successful
high-volume debtors’ attorneys. By using multiple entry points, we hoped to
increase the likelihood that our pool of interview subjects provides an adequate
basis for understanding the overall pattern of motivations for bankruptcies.
In the end, we obtained a total of forty-two interviews. We attempted to
obtain interviews in each jurisdiction with each of our principal types of
interview subjects (judge, trustee, creditors’ attorney, and debtors’ attorney) but
focused our efforts on attorneys because of their deeper relationships with
individuals in financial distress. By state, we had ten Massachusetts interviews,
46. For a general discussion of sampling methods for hidden and hard-to-reach populations, see
Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden
Populations, 44 SOC. PROBS. 174, 174–80, 190–97 (1997).
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nine Iowa interviews, seven Texas interviews, six Nevada interviews, six Geor-
gia interviews, and four interviews of attorneys and executives with national
responsibility or practice expertise not confined to our five states. By job de-
scription, we had eleven interviews with bankruptcy trustees and staff, seven-
teen interviews with debtors’ attorneys, ten interviews with creditors’ attorneys
and executives, and four interviews with bankruptcy judges. Even within those
categories, there was considerable diversity. We talked to consumer attorneys
from rural areas and urban areas, as well as solo practitioners and large-firm
practitioners. We also made a conscious effort to target debtors’ attorneys who
solicit different types of clients including indigent people eligible for legal aid
services and small business entrepreneurs with substantial incomes and assets.
Similarly, the creditors’ representatives included attorneys representing unse-
cured creditors, mortgage lenders, and government creditors, and ranged from
solo practitioners who provide a range of collection services to the executive in
charge of collection policy for one of the nation’s largest credit card issuers.
The interviews were open-ended in nature, conducted either in person or over
the telephone. All interviews were conducted by one of the principal investiga-
tors, recorded, and transcribed.47 The interviews used a script designed to elicit
general reactions to the topic rather than quantitative information. In an effort to
focus discussion, we designed the scripts to revolve around questions related to
the particular filing patterns developed in the quantitative data collection de-
scribed above. Among other things, the interviews also asked questions related
to the role of the subjects in the bankruptcy process, collection practices, the
filing decision, and attorney’s fees. The interviews ranged from twenty to ninety
minutes, usually depending on the volubility of the interview subject.
Our sampling method has at least three obvious limitations. Most obviously,
because we have no new interviews with debtors themselves—either those who
filed or those who chose not to file—all the evidence about motivation that we
obtain from these interviews is filtered through the professional perspectives of
our interview subjects. We compensate for that problem by combining the
material from these interviews with the Consumer Bankruptcy Project survey
data discussed above, which comes directly from debtors. Second, because we
relied heavily on a chain-referral sampling method, there is a possibility that the
attorneys who we interviewed are not representative of all attorneys.48 We
attempted to compensate for that problem by completing interviews with identi-
fiable types of practitioners, including high-volume filers identified through
47. One subject declined to be recorded but allowed the principal investigator to take contemporane-
ous notes. Additionally, for the sake of preserving the anonymity of the interview subjects, we have
omitted identifying details such as names and city locations when citing their interview responses. As
an alternative, we identify each with a descriptive title such as “Iowa Consumer Attorney Three,” which
corresponds to our records on file.
48. Because they have the most direct contact with bankruptcy debtors and with those who consider
but ultimately do not file for bankruptcy, problems in the representativeness of our attorney sample are
most important in assessing the reliability of our findings.
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personal contacts at the national level, attorneys who work for legal aid on debt
or bankruptcy issues, and those active in the leading consumer bankruptcy
attorney trade organization. Finally, because of the relatively limited contact
between the attorneys we interviewed and the people in financial distress who
choose not to file for bankruptcy, there is a substantial basis for concern about
the possibility that those who actually file for bankruptcy differ in important
ways from those who choose not to file for bankruptcy. Absent a method for
locating and identifying similarly situated nonfilers, we see no solution to that
problem. We are conscious of that limitation in our assessment of the informa-
tion gleaned from our interviews.
III. EMERGENCIES, EPIPHANIES, AND THE PERCEPTION OF DISTRESS
Families in financial distress are at constant risk. For every debt in default, a
creditor has legal remedies that can deprive families of their property or subject them
to legal process. Repossession of a vehicle and garnishment of wages are classic
examples of collection activities that worry families. For some, such actions could halt
their ability or incentive to continue working and thus cause immediate and total
financial collapse. Although recent empirical research on debt collection is scant, it
seems clear that creditors repeatedly warn debtors to expect imminent collection
action.49 Even if these are mere threats—frequently made but rarely exercised—
collection efforts increase the pressure on a debtor who is not paying. For this reason,
our hypothesis was that collection pressures were the primary trigger for consumers’
decisions to file for bankruptcy. We anticipated that debtors would see an attorney in
response to a specific, credible threat from a creditor and would file for bankruptcy
quickly to halt the creditor’s imminent action. We probed these intuitions by using
both quantitative and qualitative data.
A. COLLECTION PRESSURES
For the most part, state law defines a creditor’s ability to repossess collateral or file
a garnishment action. Creditors can exercise such rights at the time they arise—
typically after default for secured creditors and after a judgment for unsecured
creditors.50 Similarly, creditors are free to send dunning letters—letters that notify the
49. The initial contact is usually made by a “dunning” letter that notifies the debtor of the debt. See
ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 4 (2006). The debt collection industry contacts millions of
consumers and makes over one billion contacts per year. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
2006: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 3 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/
P0648042006FDCPAReport.pdf (noting that millions of Americans are contacted by debt collectors);
Robert M. Hunt, Collecting Consumer Debt in America, BUS. REV., 2d Quarter 2007, at 11 (stating that
debt collectors contact consumers over one billion times a year).
50. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000) (permitting self-help repossession after default); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 18-4-20 (2004) (permitting wage garnishment); IOWA CODE § 626.1 (2007) (permitting execution
following judgment); id. §§ 626.26, 642.1–.20 (permitting garnishment of wages); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 235, § 31 (West 2000) (permitting execution by creditors after default); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 21.090(1)(g) (2007) (permitting wage garnishment); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002
(Vernon 2008) (allowing execution of judgments).
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debtor of the debt—or make collection calls to debtors without systematic time
frames. State and federal law may limit the frequency of these calls and prohibit calls
at inconvenient times,52 but there is no legal restriction requiring collection activity to
occur at any particular moment in time. These are self-help activities by creditors, and
we expected that the quantitative data would show a steady and even pattern of
bankruptcy filings in response to creditors’ continual and persistent efforts to collect
by exercising (or threatening to exercise) their legal remedies.
The quantitative data, however, show distinct patterns of bankruptcies over time
that for the most part bear no obvious relation to collection activity. We looked at each
pattern with an eye to understanding how collection efforts could push consumers to
file for bankruptcy. Because state law governs most collection activities, we expected
to see different patterns in each state. For example, the legal process for foreclosure
varies dramatically in our sample states. Texas rules require all foreclosures to occur
on the first Tuesday of the month.53 This produces a pattern in which filing rates are
about five times as high on the Monday preceding the first Tuesday of the month as
on any other day of the month. Georgia has a similar pattern,54 but the peak
51. On the horizontal axis, Day 1 is the first day of a calendar month, with negative numbers
representing the days before the first day of a month.
52. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-25
(2004); IOWA CODE § 537.7103 (West Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 49 (West 2006);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 649.370, .375 (2007); TEX. FIN. CODE. ANN. § 392 (Vernon 2006).
53. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
54. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-13-161 (2006) (requiring foreclosure sales to be held between 10:00 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m. on the first Tuesday of every month).
Figure 3. 2007 Chapter 13 Filings (Percent by Day of Month)51
Source: Authors’ calculations from AACER filing data
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disappears in the other states where foreclosures are less predictable. This difference is
readily attributable to formal differences in the legal systems. The Texas data, particu-
larly for Chapter 13 filings, are consistent with our hypothesis that formal legal action
drives bankruptcy filings. In other states, foreclosures are set for any business day or
occur in small, irregular batches according to a judge’s individual preference. In these
states, foreclosure law has no discernable effect on the pattern of bankruptcy filings.
With the exception of foreclosure, we did not identify any collection-driven expla-
nation for the other filing patterns. The law constrains such collection acts with
procedural requirements but does not impose cyclical time patterns, at least in the five
jurisdictions that we examined. Nonforeclosure collection efforts proceed, then, at
the discretion of creditors. Large creditors, such as credit card issuers, have highly
sophisticated and routinized processes for collection. Proprietary algorithms guide
efforts to collect delinquent accounts.55 An individual consumer’s pleas or threats alter
the collection process only within the bounds of these larger strictures.56
The survey data suggest that collection activity is typical during the period before
bankruptcy. A majority of debtors had direct personal contact with debt collectors.57
More than four in five consumers (81.9%) said they had received calls at their homes
from debt collectors in the two years that preceded their bankruptcy filings.58 More
than half (52.9%) of respondents had received debt collection calls at their place of
work.59 This latter collection mechanism appears to exert more pressure than the more
common, mundane dunning calls or letters. Attorneys explained that many debtors
experienced the creditor reaching out to an external person as unbearable.60
55. See Telephone Interview with National Credit Card Executive 4 (Nov. 5, 8 & 12, 2007)
(transcript for this and all subsequent interviews on file with authors).
[W]e have another set of scores that if the account does go delinquent[,] we score it. So we
kind of continuously monitor[,] and then we have treatment strategies and decision engines
that are fed the score as activity changes to make a determination that would decide the
appropriate course of action for different accounts. So that generally is how the industry, and
certainly how we, operate[,] and you know those models are technological property of the
banks. They are so critical . . . .
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney Two 7 (Sept. 16, 2008) (“Some of our
clients use modeling to help us make decisions. They will give us a score to determine the collectability
of the person.”).
56. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney Two, supra note 55, at 6 (describing
variation in creditor clients between those who have very specific collection guidelines and internal
determinations and those who permit the collection attorney to exercise his professional judgment);
Telephone Interview with Ga. Creditor Attorney One 11 (Sept. 26, 2008) (noting that every lender has a
different set of criteria for instituting litigation).
57. We use the term “debt collector” here because that is how the Consumer Bankruptcy Project
survey question was worded, but we see little reason to expect that respondents interpreted the term
narrowly to apply only to third-party debt collectors as defined in the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)(F) (2006). Instead, we believe respondents were more likely to use the term in its ordinary
sense to include any person who is asking them to pay an outstanding obligation.
58. 2007 CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, TELEPHONE INTERVIEW ques. DC01 (2007) (on file with Kather-
ine Porter) (n  1032).
59. Id. at ques. DC02 (2007) (on file with Katherine Porter) (n  1032).
60. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Consumer Attorney One 7 (Sept. 12, 2008) (“[A] lot of people
say[,] ‘I just don’t answer my cell phone[,]’ but when it goes to the job, I do think it crosses a line,
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Before the automatic stay of bankruptcy halted the phone calls, debt col-
lection was part of the daily routine of these financially distressed house-
holds, taking its place alongside other daily activities such as loading the
dishwasher and checking the mail. Among those who reported getting debt
collection calls either at home or work, the normal debtor received an average
of thirteen debt collection calls in each of the weeks just prior to their bank-
ruptcy filing. The median respondent reported getting six calls each week, more
than one per business day.61 Reasonable minds may differ regarding the ques-
tion of how oppressive this collection activity is, and surely there are outlying
experiences, but the survey data suggest that the typical consumers were
enduring one or two calls per day in the period immediately preceding their
bankruptcy.62
B. THE MYTH OF THE EMERGENCY FILING
None of the bankruptcy professionals to whom we spoke regarded emergency
petitions as a major part of their practice.63 To the extent the interviews suggest
anything specific about emergency filings, they suggest (not surprisingly) that
they are more common in Chapter 13 cases than Chapter 7 cases; this follows
logically from the likelihood that Chapter 13 cases are more commonly used to
yes.”); see also Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One 10 (Sept. 17, 2007) (identifying calling a
neighbor or calling at work as two debt collection techniques that prompt bankruptcy filings because
debtors cannot tolerate them). The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors within its scope from contacting a
debtor’s employer if the collector knows that the employer forbids such communication. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692c(a)(3). The burden is on the debtor, however, to inform the collector, a request that consumers
are unlikely to think to make until collectors have already contacted their employers.
61. See 2007 CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, supra note 58, at ques. DC03 (on file with Katherine
Porter) (n  826; standard deviation  18.7). We excluded two responses as outliers.
62. The collection activity itself may not prompt bankruptcy filings because consumers are adept at
developing coping mechanisms to mitigate the effects of the dunning calls. See Ronald Paul Hill, Bill
Collectors and Consumers: A Troublesome Exchange Relationship, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 20,
27–28 (1994) (describing how consumers alter their telephone use and go on the offensive in response
to collection harassment); Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal
Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77, 86 (2006) (“In the face of unrelenting harassment, almost 90 percent of
debtors developed strategies—such as the use of caller ID—for avoiding interaction with bill collec-
tors.”); Telephone Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor 9 (Feb. 6, 2009) (describing counseling of
debtors, often unsuccessful, to change their telephone numbers).
63. See, e.g., Interview with Iowa Chapter 7 Trustee 5 (Sept. 24, 2007) (“I don’t see a lot of
emergency filings.”); Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee 7–8 (Aug. 10, 2007) (noting that emergency
filings by “quality” lawyers are rare because good lawyers recognize that they need time to advise their
client); Telephone Interview with Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 13 (“So now we are
turning away people who call the Thursday or Friday before foreclosure on Tuesday. I usually give
them the number to one of the big firms who has 20 attorneys or something like that.”); Telephone
Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor, supra note 62, at 6 (saying that emergency filings “don’t seem to
be much of an issue” with people seeking mandatory prebankruptcy credit counseling); Telephone
Interview with N.J. Debtor Attorney 3 (May 4, 2009) (“Most of my . . . clients come to me well in
advance of a major problem that would shut them down. There are some notable exceptions[,] but most
of them are smart enough to seek counsel well in advance.”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer
Attorney Three 16 (Sept. 24, 2008) (confirming that emergency petitions are relatively rare).
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avert foreclosure than Chapter 7 filings.64 Also, the interviews suggest substan-
tial variation across states, with a greater share of emergency cases in jurisdic-
tions in which the time frame for foreclosure is shorter than in those in which
the time frame for foreclosure is longer.65
Taking these points in order, first, our interviews suggest, at least among the
clients seeking assistance from the attorneys to whom we spoke, that emergency
Chapter 7 filings are quite rare.66 For example, the initiation of a collection suit
does not ordinarily result in an immediate bankruptcy petition. The reason is
that the leisurely pace at which civil litigation proceeds gives consumers and
their attorneys ample time to respond before anything might happen in the
litigation that would cause sufficient dislocation to motivate an emergency
bankruptcy filing. For example, one Texas consumer attorney said that a collec-
tion lawsuit “does not affect the timing [of bankruptcy] generally . . . . We
explain to them, ‘[I]f you’re gonna file bankruptcy, there is no huge rush. We
need to file an answer[,] and then you have six months before anything is going
to happen[.]’ So that does not really affect the timing.”67 Chapter 7 bankruptcies
64. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 3; Telephone Interview with
Mass. Consumer Attorney Three 2 (Oct. 9, 2007); Telephone Interview with Mass. Creditor Attorney
Two 4–6 (Oct. 24, 2007); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney One 4 (Oct. 23, 2007);
Interview with Nev. Creditor Attorney 2 (Oct. 29, 2007); Telephone Interview with Tex. Bankruptcy
Judge Two 1–2 (Oct. 3, 2007); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One 5 (Oct. 5, 2007).
65. See Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney One 1–2 (Oct. 17, 2007) (reporting that most con-
sumers get a six-month delay before the foreclosure sale and estimating that only 5 to 10% of fore-
closures result in a bankruptcy filing); Interview with Nev. Chapter 13 Trustee 15–16 (Oct. 26, 2007)
(stating that the longer process allows for a “grieving” period, a time for a debtor to realize he cannot
keep his home); Telephone Interview with Ga. Bankruptcy Judge 5 (Sept. 11, 2008) (attributing high
rate of emergency filings in Georgia to speed of foreclosure process); Telephone Interview with Ga.
Trustee Two 3–4 (Feb. 5, 2009) (suggesting a peak of filings in Georgia just before the first Tuesday of
the month); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 15 (stating that
clients file Chapter 13 because the foreclosure process is so fast and they need time to find a place to
live).
66. We considered the possibility that the lack of information about emergency filings might reflect a
selection bias in the types of attorneys to whom we spoke. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra
note 63, at 7 (“The good attorneys very seldom had as many emergency filings.”). For example, it is
possible that the attorneys located by our chain referral methodology were more connected to broad
social networks than attorneys in general and that the clients who contact attorneys to whom they are
connected through a social network may be more willing to do so without the pressure of an emergency.
If that is true, then the clients who contact attorneys located solely through market information (such as
advertising) might require the greater stimulus of an emergency to force them to seek formal relief. See
Telephone Interview with Ga. Trustee Two, supra note 65, at 7 (suggesting that high-volume filers are
more likely to attract clients through advertising, especially on television); Telephone Interview with
N.J. Debtor Attorney, supra note 63, at 2 (same). We have attempted to mitigate that concern by a series
of interviews with high-volume filers who rely heavily on advertising to attract clients. Those inter-
views suggest very little, if any, greater propensity for emergency filings than the discussions with
attorneys identified through our chain referral methodology.
67. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two 5 (Nov. 7, 2007); see also Interview
with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 13 (“Just because the debt collector says[,] ‘[I]f
you do not get a payment in here on Friday, I am going to garnish your wages on Friday[,]’ does not
mean he is garnishing your wages on Friday. What he . . . left out in the conversation is all the things
that he has to do in the meantime before he can get to that point . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Nev.
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typically lag behind the attorney consultation by several weeks or months, a
delay that reflects the lack of immediate collection pressure on consumers.68
To be sure, collection pressure can eventually lead to collection activity of
sufficient vigor to motivate an emergency filing, but this seems to be the
exception rather than the rule. The basic problem is that, even when they
institute litigation,69 creditors face considerable difficulty in using litigation to
recover from consumers. The vast majority of consumer Chapter 7 cases are
no-asset cases.70 Thus, although the return on collection efforts differs some-
what for those who have not chosen to file for bankruptcy, it surely is true that
for many households in financial distress, state or federal law shields all of their
assets from execution.71 After a bankruptcy attorney tells a consumer that this
body of law protects his property from seizure by his creditors, many consumers
do not rush to file for bankruptcy immediately. An Iowa attorney explained:
[O]nce they come and see me and talk it through and realize that they are
pretty much in the driver seat in terms of when they can file and that it is not
likely that the garnishments or anything will occur before they can file, they
sometimes lose the sense of that urgency for a bit[,] and they can put up
[with] a lot of harassment if they know that ultimately it is not going to cause
[them] any loss of income or property.72
Indeed, in states in which garnishment is not available,73 the creditor often can
Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 11 (explaining that he informs his clients that if “no one has
sued you” they cannot garnish your wages).
68. See Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 4 (estimating that delay
from retention of his services to filing of case was four to six months for most Chapter 7 cases);
Telephone Interview with Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 3 (estimating that Chapter 7
cases are not filed for two to three months); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One,
supra note 64, at 2 (noting that Chapter 7 cases tend to be filed in batches because they are not facing
any definite deadline).
69. A substantial fraction of Chapter 7 cases are filed before a creditor has completed legal action.
See Interview with Iowa Chapter 7 Trustee, supra note 63, at 10 (estimating that 25% of bankruptcy
debtors have judgments against them); Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at
13 (saying that only a very small percentage of clients have actually been garnished); Telephone
Interview with N.J. Debtor Attorney, supra note 63, at 4 (suggesting that clients with substantial non-
exempt assets tend to file for bankruptcy before collection actions proceed to judgment); Telephone
Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 10 (stating that probably less than 20%
of Chapter 7 clients have had lawsuits filed against them).
70. See supra note 5.
71. The relevant question for the family that has not yet filed for bankruptcy is what assets are
exempt from execution under state law. The answer differs markedly from state to state. See generally
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6 (describing variations in state exemption laws).
72. Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 9; see also Telephone Interview
with Nev. Consumer Attorney Two 2 (Feb. 4, 2009) (“I ask, ‘Well is anybody suing you?’ If not, then I
go[,] ‘[A]lright well, we will just hold the creditors off again.’ We do debt defense as well; that’s part of
the services that we offer . . . .”).
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (2009) (prohibiting wage garnishment of a debtor who is sup-
porting a family with wage income); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8127 (2008) (prohibiting wage garnishment
except in limited circumstances such as divorce or child support); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-104 (2009)
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do little to collect even after it has obtained a judgment. In states that offer no
more protection from garnishment than federal law, such as Georgia, our
interviews suggested that postjudgment garnishments do prompt debtors to
consult bankruptcy attorneys.74 But, even those filings are unlikely to be
emergency filings given the lengthy period of litigation likely to precede the
judgment necessary for the garnishment.75
The dynamic is different in Chapter 13, which involves repayment of debts
over years and has special provisions to help homeowners catch up on missed
payments. The discussion above suggests that some share of Chapter 13 filings
are emergency filings directly motivated by the desire to forestall an imminent
foreclosure sale. Although foreclosure is the most common triggering event
among Chapter 13 debtors,76 not all foreclosure-driven filings occur on the eve
of the foreclosure sale. A few consumers contact an attorney shortly before a
foreclosure sale—occasionally on the very day of the sale.77 Most attorneys,
however, reported a distaste for representing clients under that time pressure.78
Substantial differences in foreclosure law from state to state suggest a wide
variation in the typical time consumed by a foreclosure proceeding.79 Thus, in
(prohibiting wage garnishment for consumer credit agreements); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 31.0025 (Vernon 2008) (prohibiting wage garnishment except for child support).
74. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Bankruptcy Judge, supra note 65, at 8 (“Now, we get a fair
amount of garnishment though.”); Telephone Interview with Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note
60, at 8 (“I think many, many, many clients are dealing with . . . [garnishment] by the time they come to
see us . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Ga. Creditor Attorney One, supra note 56, at 8 (affirming that
garnishment is common in Georgia and explaining that it is “very easy to garnish . . . . Georgia is a
very, very, very creditor-friendly state[,] and as a result I think that’s one of the reasons that our
bankruptcy numbers are so high.”).
75. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Debtor Attorney Two 9–10 (Jan. 23, 2009) (describing relative
rapidity and limited procedural protections of Georgia’s garnishment scheme compared to other states
but noting that even in Georgia, it takes forty-five days to obtain a default judgment); Telephone In-
terview with N.J. Debtor Attorney, supra note 63, at 4 (suggesting that pace of postjudgment execution
process in New Jersey motivates prejudgment bankruptcy filings).
76. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Four 2–3 (Sept. 11, 2008) (confirming
that foreclosure is the most common cause of Chapter 13 bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with Mass.
Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 2 (stating that, in his practice, Chapter 13 filings are
triggered by foreclosures); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 5
(stating that the threat of foreclosure drives 40% of his Chapter 13 filings); Telephone Interview with
Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 2 (stating that the biggest day for Chapter 13 filings in
Texas is the Monday before “Foreclosure Tuesday”).
77. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Bankruptcy Judge, supra note 65, at 5 (reporting that largest
debtors’ firm in area kept its office open until 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. on the evening before the foreclosure
day and advertised that accommodation); Telephone Interview with Mass. Chapter 13 Trustee 5 (Sept.
24, 2007) (“I actually spoke to a debtor this morning who is having a sale at 12 noon today.”).
78. See, e.g., Interview with Iowa Chapter 7 Trustee, supra note 63, at 5 (“[V]ery rarely do you have
someone come in and say, ‘[T]hey are going to have a sheriff sale tomorrow in my house. I’ve got to
file today.’ I mean, in fact, I don’t like to take those kind of cases.”); Telephone Interview with Ga.
Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 15 (explaining reluctance to take emergency cases because
“it would be too easy for us to make a mistake and to somehow become involved in something bad”).
79. For example, the HUD foreclosure time frame table suggests a range from three months (Texas),
to four months (Georgia), to six months (Nevada), to eight months (Massachusetts), to nine months
(Iowa). THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SERVICER’S REFERENCE DIRECTORY C13–14 (24th ed. 2007). In the
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Iowa (which seems to have the most leisurely foreclosure process in our study),
foreclosure-driven bankruptcies typically are filed in the middle of the process,
a few months after a complaint was filed but a few months before a scheduled
sale.80 Emergency bankruptcy petitions were extremely rare in Iowa, even for
foreclosure-driven Chapter 13 cases.81 By contrast, attorneys in Texas, where a
nonjudicial foreclosure can occur three weeks after notice of the sale,82 reported
a frequent pattern of emergency foreclosure-driven filings on short time lines.83
As one experienced creditors’ attorney put it, most Chapter 13 cases in Texas
are “time driven by secured creditors” who are foreclosing on a home.84
Georgia professionals reported nearly identical effects.85 For those who have
not experienced the spectacle of thousands of foreclosures occurring at a single
location simultaneously at ten in the morning on the first Tuesday of the month,
the time pressure imposed by the Texas and Georgia systems is difficult to
comprehend.86 The fast time frame for foreclosure reduces the amount of time
for a consumer to decide whether to seek bankruptcy counsel and then sharply
limits the ability of attorneys to proceed at a leisurely pace in filing the case.
Professionals in Massachusetts and Nevada described an interaction between a
foreclosure and a bankruptcy case that was somewhere in between the extremes
of Iowa and Texas or Georgia.87
experience of the authors, three months overstates the time required in Texas, while nine months
understates the time required in Iowa.
80. See Interview Iowa Consumer Attorney Two 20 (Sept. 24, 2007); Telephone Interview with Iowa
Consumer Attorney Four, supra note 76, at 3 (describing consultation right before sale as occurring
“more rarely than not” and observing that “the majority by far” of homeowners facing foreclosure
consult him at the beginning of that process shortly after they get served with the foreclosure petition).
81. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Four, supra note 76, at 3 (describing
initial client consultations right before foreclosure sale as rare and observing that “the majority by far”
of homeowners facing foreclosure consult him at the beginning of that process shortly after they get
served with the foreclosure petition).
82. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
83. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 3 (“Most of them
procrastinate until the last minute and come in with a week or less to go [before the foreclosure sale].”);
see Telephone Interview with Ga. Bankruptcy Judge, supra note 65, at 5 (agreeing that Georgia has
“lots of emergencies, a whole lot” and that filings motivated by foreclosure occur “very close in time to
the sale”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 1.
84. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 1.
85. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Debtor Attorney Two, supra note 75, at 8 (analogizing effect
of Georgia’s rapid foreclosure process to a gun to the head of homeowners and suggesting that debtors
file to avoid making decisions under that immediate pressure).
86. Apparently, there is also a spectacle at debtors’ law firms, as well. See id. at 7 (“You should be
here on foreclosure Tuesday. We will probably have 25 or 30 people here at our office at 7 o’clock on
Tuesday morning before the foreclosure.”).
87. See Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 4 (“Massachu-
setts has effectively a four-month procedure [for foreclosure]. . . . [A] foreclosure Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy case, in my experience, will be filed during the last six weeks before the auction.”); Telephone
Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 72, at 5 (“A lot are coming in because of
foreclosure. Basically they tell the story, ‘[H]ey I tried to do a mortgage modification[,] and they told
me how to miss more payments. And now they are starting a foreclosure[,] and nobody will talk to me.’
I get a lot of that.”); id. at 10 (suggesting that most emergency filings are foreclosure-driven); Tele-
2010] 311SAVING UP FOR BANKRUPTCY
Though professionals reported that foreclosures trigger a significant fraction
of Chapter 13 cases,88 there are other reasons for Chapter 13 filings. Different
interview subjects suggested, for example, bankruptcies motivated to save
cars,89 bankruptcies motivated by medical expenses,90 and on rare occasions,
bankruptcies steered out of Chapter 7 by the means test, which screens people
for Chapter 7 eligibility based on their income and expenses.91 For these cases,
there is apparently very little time pressure to file at a particular moment.92 In
this regard, nonforeclosure Chapter 13 cases are similar to Chapter 7 cases.
phone Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor, supra note 62, at 6–7 (suggesting that “there is not an
emergency filing, in my opinion,” because the only “emergency” that clients usually identify is an
imprudent desire to file bankruptcy to keep a home that they cannot afford).
88. Though each individual bankruptcy professional offered his or her own estimate, the main
variance was between attorneys in different states. Compare Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney
One, supra note 60, at 3 (Iowa attorney opining that “probably only 15% or so of my filings are Chapter
13’s[,] and of those maybe half of those, or slightly more, are driven by foreclosures”), and Interview
with Nev. Chapter 13 Staff Attorney 7 (Oct. 26, 2007) (Nevada attorney saying that “not a large per-
cent” of foreclosures that she instigated as creditors’ attorney resulted in a bankruptcy filing by the
homeowner), with Telephone Interview with Ga. Creditor Attorney One, supra note 56, at 8 (estimating
that 70% of Chapter 13 filings can be attributed primarily to foreclosure), Telephone Interview with
Mass. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 77, at 4 (Massachusetts trustee opining that foreclosure is
“[a]bsolutely” the most common reason for filing Chapter 13 cases), and Telephone Interview with Tex.
Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 3 (estimating that foreclosure is bringing 60–70% of
putative Chapter 13 debtors to consult him).
89. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Bankruptcy Judge, supra note 65, at 6 (expressing opinion
that to him a “surprising” portion of Chapter 13 cases have only a car as secured debt).
90. The pattern here is a mature (often elderly) household with a steady income and important assets
but medical expenses that cannot be defrayed using existing assets. See Telephone Interview with Tex.
Bankruptcy Judge Two, supra note 64, at 7.
91. See Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 5 (reporting that
some of the 60% of non-foreclosure-driven Chapter 13 bankruptcies are people with excess income
who file a Chapter 13 case because of the means test or to avoid a challenge for abuse); Telephone
Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 3–4 (noting that a small percentage of
bankruptcies are caused by people who cannot pass the means test but need to file a bankruptcy because
of huge medical bills or tax debt). The means test requires all Chapter 7 filers to disclose their incomes
for the past six months, and then a further subset must go through an expense calculation and
comparison. Those whose financial position meets statutory criteria are not eligible for a Chapter 7
filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. 2008).
92. See Telephone Interview with Tex. Chapter 13 Trustee 7 (Sept. 27, 2007) (explaining that what
gets people to the door of a bankruptcy attorney on a particular day “is almost always foreclosure . . . .
There are other reasons people file 13, but those do not really care so much about the timing.”). A few
professionals said that car repossession could prompt a bankruptcy, especially where a debtor was
dependent on the car to travel to work, but that these filings seemed less immediate. Telephone
Interview with Ga. Trustee Two, supra note 65, at 4–5 (“They may file to stop that repossession, but I
don’t see that as much as an emergency filing.”). We can identify some reasons for the difference
between foreclosures and car repossession. First, unlike a completed foreclosure sale, which is final, a
repossessed car that has not yet been sold can be recovered in bankruptcy. Second, the exact date of a
foreclosure sale is set in advance, and the debtor receives at least a month’s notice of this date. By
contrast, a creditor does not (unless it is very foolish) advise a consumer in advance of the date it will
repossess a car. Finally, as we teach our students every year in secured credit, a debtor can hide tangible
personal property or otherwise guard it from self-help repossession, an option that is not available for
real property.
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C. COMING TO TERMS WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE
In the aggregate, the data suggest that the great majority of bankruptcy filings
are not frantic acts of desperation.93 Indeed, as one trustee explained, “[Y]ou
never know when someone is going to file until they do it. People say that they
are going to file all the time and never get around to it.”94 With the exception of
foreclosure-driven filings in states with rapid foreclosure processes, bankruptcy
cases typically are the result of a long decision process.
During the period before bankruptcy, consumers deploy avoidance techniques
to deter collection. An Iowa creditor’s attorney explained:
[M]ost people that I would call are using what I call the “ostrich defense.”
You know I am not the first person to get the file. . . . [M]ost people disappear.
I am just another person calling on the obligation[,] and they don’t answer the
phone or they use caller ID technology.95
With property that is collateral, debtors sometimes initially refuse to surrender it
or hide the property, eventually forcing the creditor to file a replevin action.96
Most debtors do not immediately recognize the consequences of their financial
plight.97
The survey data also provide support for the idea that a bankruptcy is the
end-stage of a long process. The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project asked
debtors in the telephone interviews how long they had seriously struggled with
their debts before they filed bankruptcy. The answers were closed-ended, blunt
categories, and the distribution of responses suggests that the researchers substan-
tially underestimated the length of hardship that precedes bankruptcy. The most
common response was the longest time period, more than two years. As shown
in Figure 4, more than seven in ten bankruptcy debtors reported a serious
93. In every recent year, Chapter 7 nonbusiness cases have outnumbered Chapter 13 cases, usually
by a ratio of two to one. For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2008, 615,748 Chapter 7 cases
were filed compared to 344,421 Chapter 13 cases. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note
1. Given that only some fraction of Chapter 13 cases are foreclosure-driven and that only a subset of
these are time-sensitive cases motivated by an imminent foreclosure sale, a generous estimate of the
fraction of emergency bankruptcy petitions is probably 10%.
94. Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney One 3 (Sept. 24, 2007). In the most
egregious situation of this type reported to us, one consumer apparently considered a bankruptcy filing
for nearly a decade. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 9 (“I had a
client one time that took over eight years for her to finally file. She came along every couple of years
and gave me a couple hundred more dollars to keep working for her and promising she was going to file
in the next couple of weeks[,] and then I would not see her for about two years.”).
95. Telephone Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney Two, supra note 55, at 5.
96. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Creditor Attorney One, supra note 56, at 9 (“I mean there is
almost a spiteful thing and they just don’t want the lender to get the car back[,] and they don’t want to
have to pay on a car that they don’t have. So they will give it to a family member[,] and then they will
take it out of state and it will go to Texas[,] and then all of a sudden it ends up in Mexico.”).
97. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 16 (“There is an unwillingness to
recognize that financial trouble; there is an unwillingness to recognize that they are going to lose their
family home.”).
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struggle with debts that exceeded one year.
Interviews with debtors’ attorneys reinforced our confidence in the self-
reported data from debtors.98 A Georgia attorney reported that “it’s very, very
common for people to say[,] ‘I should have done this years ago’ or ‘I should
have done this about two years ago.’ So I don’t think it’s a snap decision to
contact an attorney.”99 Consumers do not go broke at the first hint of collection
pressure.
This is not to say that collection efforts are irrelevant to bankruptcy filings.
On the contrary, if creditors did nothing to collect their debts, the rate of
bankruptcy filings would drop precipitously. The lack of immediacy, however,
does suggest (outside the foreclosure context) that the effect of collection
activity is mediated by some intervening variable. Thus, we suggest, the most
98. See Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney One, supra note 65, at 14 (estimating it took people
six months to two years to reach resignation of need for bankruptcy); see also Thorne & Anderson,
supra note 62, at 83 (“To avoid the stigma of bankruptcy altogether, the majority of debtors reported
that they postponed filing for months and even years after recognizing that their debts were unmanage-
able.”).
99. Telephone Interview with Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 21; see also Interview
with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 80, at 8 (estimating that it takes at least six months for
people to realize their financial problems are irremediable without bankruptcy relief); Telephone
Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Four, supra note 76, at 13 (reporting that people struggled a
“long time” before they filed bankruptcy).
Figure 4. Time Seriously Struggling Before Bankruptcy
Source: 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
314 [Vol. 98:289THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
important effect of collection activity is not its potential to disrupt the house-
hold economy in a way that forces immediate recourse to bankruptcy.100 It is,
rather, an increasingly cacophonous “drum beat” of collection activity, which
slowly but surely convinces the consumer that on balance the best response is to
silence the creditors by seeking relief in bankruptcy.
Survey data from consumer debtors provide some support for this conceptual-
ization of the bankruptcy decision. A written survey that debtors completed
shortly after their bankruptcy filings provided a list of approximately a dozen
reasons for bankruptcy and asked debtors to select all options that applied to
their situations. Slightly less than half (43.8%) of all respondents chose “aggres-
sive collection efforts by creditors.”101 Among homeowners, about one third
(34.2%) of bankruptcy filers identified “a lender threatened to foreclose” as the
event that prompted their bankruptcy filing.102 These responses suggest that
collection efforts do not drive the majority of bankruptcy filings in an obvious
and linear way. Interestingly, when the question was framed differently, asking
about “pressure from debt collectors,” rather than “aggressive collection efforts,”
a much higher proportion of debtors affirmed that collection activity was either
“very much” (56%) or “somewhat” (20.7%) a reason for their bankruptcies.103
Although we are cautious in relying heavily on this difference, it does give
some credence to our theory of the interaction between debt collection activity
and bankruptcy filings.104
The bankruptcy professionals whom we interviewed offered rich descriptions
of the emotional process that led debtors over time to consult them about
bankruptcy. They described a grinding psychological toll from collection that
eventually proved intolerable to debtors. “Most of it is that they cannot sleep at
100. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 15 (“That sort of legal
explanation is not the issue. When I say[,] ‘[Y]ou are not going to stop the collection calls without a
bankruptcy,’ then they are going to file for bankruptcy . . . .”); see also Telephone Interview with Ga.
Debtor Attorney Two, supra note 75, at 4–5 (“We can sit there and counsel them and say[,] ‘[L]ook,
you just have Social Security, they can’t take anything from you.’ And some of them just start crying
and they say[,] ‘I am so embarrassed to be here, I was always taught to pay my debts[,] but they are
calling me and calling me[,] and I can’t make them stop . . . .’”).
101. 2007 CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, WRITTEN SURVEY ques. 25 (2007) (on file with Katherine
Porter) (n  2438).
102. Id. at ques. 25 (on file with Katherine Porter) (n  1175). Of course, some of these home-
owners are current on their mortgage obligations but woefully behind on other debts. Most households
that face imminent foreclosure filed Chapter 13 because of its greater home-saving potential. See
Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121,
141–42 (2008).
103. The exact question posed: “Was pressure from debt collectors very much, somewhat, or not at
all a reason that you finally filed for bankruptcy?” 2007 CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, supra note 58, at
ques. DC08 (2007) (on file with Katherine Porter) (n  1032).
104. Other plausible explanations exist for the disparity in responses besides the different wording of
the questions. The question about pressure from debt collectors was asked in the telephone interview as
opposed to the written survey; perhaps this medium affected responses. Also, the telephone interview
was conducted later than the written survey, and perhaps time affected debtors’ perceptions of why they
filed for bankruptcy relief.
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night because they cannot figure how to pay all their bills, and the phone is
ringing excessively with the creditors who are incredibly rude and very difficult
to deal with.”105 Another attorney said that people experienced immediate and
palpable psychological relief. He described the dynamic of the attorney consulta-
tion as follows:
At almost all of our initial consultations, people come in, their shoulders are
up around their ears, they are very stressed, very tense, and you can see them
start sinking back further and further in their chair relaxing, and then most of
them will say, I mean I have heard this a million times, “You know, now I can
sleep at night.”106
Consumers do not reach the bankruptcy decision easily. Although this Arti-
cle’s title is primarily a reference to the financial costs of bankruptcy, debtors
must “save up” certain emotional resources, such as humility, before they will
consider bankruptcy. Indeed, it is precisely in the cases in which debtors act
quickly—predominantly home foreclosure cases—that a bankruptcy filing often
reflects a failure to come to grips with the reality of financial failure. In many of
those cases, a consumer may have been better off allowing a foreclosure to
proceed rather than suffering through a Chapter 13 process in which a home
inevitably will be lost.107
A debtor’s attorney described consumers’ internal reckoning with their own
capacities to manage their financial circumstances:
I mean you can just get so many of those creditor calls before you finally
blow[,] . . . and I think that most of the people, by the time they get here[,]
they do not know what to do. . . . [W]hen they finally have exhausted every-
thing they know they can do, they finally go to somebody else and say[,] “I
don’t know what to do now.”108
105. Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Two 7 (Oct. 1, 2007); see also Telephone
Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 94, at 9 (“[For] my clients universally, it is
the psychological pressure . . . . There is something that is psychological and puts them over the
edge . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 10 (“They are
gaining what I would call peace of mind because phone calls are going to stop. The letters are going to
stop, which was very stressful for a lot of these people because most if not all people take this stuff very
seriously.”).
106. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 12.
107. See Telephone Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor, supra note 62, at 7.
108. Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 80, at 13; see also Telephone Inter-
view with Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 7 (“[T]hey are calling multiple times a day,
they are calling [the debtor’s] job, they are calling [the debtor’s] neighbors, they are calling [the
debtor’s] mom and dad . . . that kind of thing. That just gets unbearable[,] and the debtor says[,] ‘I can’t
take this anymore.’”); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 10
(“As I said, there are people who are judgment proof. And they say[,] ‘[W]ell, I just can’t stand the calls
anymore.’”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 92, at 10 (“What pushes
them to make the filing . . . is that one phone call too many. They just can’t stand the phone calls
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Another attorney analogized consumers’ reactions to financial distress to the
stages of grief. He described an initial reaction of denial, followed by displace-
ment in which the consumer blamed others for their financial pressures, fol-
lowed by a period of anger or hostility, and concluding with resignation, during
which time the consumer would then file for bankruptcy.109 Ultimately, at least
from the perspective of the attorneys to whom we spoke, the primary trigger for
initiating a legal consultation about bankruptcy is the internal epiphanic mo-
ment when the consumer realizes that the likelihood of managing the debt
burden is so small that it is no longer worth trying given the burden of
continued collection efforts.110
As Deborah Thorne explains, the pattern is complicated by the internal
dynamic of the household.111 It is not enough for one spouse to fall into despair;
the spouse must reach a level of despair sufficient to force an admission of the
problem to the other.112 Some attorneys noted an imbalance in the rapidity with
which men and women come to terms with their financial collapse. A Texas
attorney marketed specifically to women in recognition of this gendered pattern.
“Mostly the women are the ones who make the decision to call . . . . The women
say[,] ‘I have wanted to come in here forever[,] but he would not come with me
[because] he doesn’t want to file.’”113 Most respondents attributed men’s reluc-
tance to fully acknowledge the severity of the couple’s financial problems to
stereotypes about men’s belief that they bear a disproportionate responsibility to
anymore.”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 9 (“It’s just the
emotional pressure of ‘I can’t handle this alone[,] and I am going to call somebody.’”).
109. Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney One, supra note 65, at 13; see also Interview with Iowa
Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 9 (saying that when people “realize that they don’t want to
be putting up with that [debt collection] day in and day out, they decide to file bankruptcy”).
110. See Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Four 3 (Oct. 17, 2007) (stating that
filing is a result of a “gradual realization”); see also Telephone Interview with Mass. Bankruptcy Judge
7 (Oct. 1, 2007) (“[S]ome debtors just get worn down by the harassing phone calls[,] and they just get
tired of the whole thing . . . .”).
111. See Deborah K. Thorne, Personal Bankruptcy Through the Eyes of the Stigmatized: Insight into
Issues of Shame, Gender, and Marital Discord (May 2001) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Washington
State University) (on file with author) (describing how couples interact during the prebankruptcy period
of collection harassment).
112. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Four, supra note 76, at 7 (“Sometimes
one of the parties is more driven to recognizing this is an unsolvable situation. The other wants to be
more stoic about it or [is] thinking that after months and months, we will find a way to pay.”); see also
Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 16 (reporting that the marital discord that
accompanies financial distress means that one person in a marriage is usually more interested in seeing
an attorney).
113. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 12; see also
Telephone Interview with Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 19 (“I think my gut answer
would be that generally the wife recognizes the need to do something more than the husband[,] and the
husband is more apt to ignore it or tell the wife that ‘this is your problem, you deal with it’ or something
of that nature. If I can tell one of the individuals wants to file and the other does not, then, if I can make
a general statement, then it’s the husband who doesn’t want to file.”); Thorne, supra note 111, at 233
(“From the managing of an unmanageable debt to the decision to actually file for personal bankruptcy,
the responsibility falls primarily on women.”).
2010] 317SAVING UP FOR BANKRUPTCY
provide for their families.114 Although a rich area for further ethnographic work,
this finding’s primary relevance here is in revealing the existence of a self-
realization process that must occur before a bankruptcy.
In the end, the appropriate metaphor is not the flood that washes away
resistance, but the steady drip that wears away the stone. Because those effects
are, for the most part, not driven by seasonal or other calendric patterns, they
leave no trace in the quantitative data on filing patterns we discuss below. The
survey data show that aggressive pressure or emergency reactions to imminent
threats are relatively isolated events. Most bankruptcies occur only after consum-
ers have endured a lengthy period of collection pressure and finally come to a
realization of the dire state of their financial affairs.
IV. DOLLARS DRIVE BANKRUPTCY FILINGS
The second cluster of findings from our interviews provides explanations for
the specific time of bankruptcy filings, separating the moment at which the
consumer decides to file for bankruptcy from the moment the filing actually
occurs. Although it was not one of our initial hypotheses, the findings suggest
that the costs of filing for bankruptcy are an important determinant for the
specific timing of the filing. Thus, the interviews suggest, in general, a lesser
emphasis on the need for emergency relief from the bankruptcy court and a
greater emphasis on the need to produce funds adequate to defray the fees of the
attorney and other filing costs. The general pattern is illustrated by one attor-
ney’s suggestion that the decision to file for most of his clients was an easy, if
not obvious, one and that “[t]he issue [that determines when they actually file]
for a lot of them is simply saving up the retainer, which again if they had a lot
of money[,] they wouldn’t be coming to see me in the first place.”115
What was most interesting about the patterns of filing data was the extent to
which they not only bore out that perception, but revealed a multifaceted
pattern, with a variety of different monetary effects evident at the annual,
monthly, and weekly levels. This Part of the Article discusses the most obvious
114. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 21 (“The guy has learned the stoic
WASP approach, you got to work harder; it is all my fault because I am not working it right[,] and so as
a result he worries and the wife knows but they [the wives] do not want to bring it up too much[,] and
so other parts of their relationship go to hell in a hand basket, too.”); see also Telephone Interview with
Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 21 (explaining that men often do not come in because
they get nervous or lose confidence).
115. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 11. For similar
sentiments, see Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 19–20 (suggesting that
it is more common for debtors to have made the decision to file and need the money to do so than the
reverse); Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 94, at 5; Telephone
Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 6 (“They tell themselves they were
not [going to file for bankruptcy] when they come to see me, but I am sure that they know there is no
alternative[,] and therefore the delay after they see me is always because they need time to come up
with the money. It is a real sticker shock when I tell them what it costs these days.”); Telephone
Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 2, 4–5.
318 [Vol. 98:289THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
puzzles suggested by our quantitative data and the evidence from the interviews
on which we rely to explain these puzzles as attributable to the costs and delays
associated with the filing process.
A. THE TAX REFUND EFFECT AND THE ANNUAL PATTERN
The first of the puzzles is that bankruptcy filings rise steadily during the first
third of the year before becoming relatively flat during the latter two-thirds of
the year. Figure 5 illustrates the annual filing pattern for each of our five states,
using Chapter 7 data, in which the pattern is particularly noticeable.
Based on preliminary informal conversations before we began our interviews,
one of us started with the hypothesis that the most likely basis for the surge in
Chapter 7 filings would be overspending during the December holiday sea-
son.116 Some of our interview subjects accepted that explanation. But the more
we talked to those who represent debtors, the more we became convinced that
an alternate explanation is an important part of the story: debtors wait to file
until their tax refunds become available to defray the costs of filing.117 As one
attorney explained, “They need . . . the money to pay their lawyer, which they
have to wait for from the tax refunds[,] and no lawyer in his right mind is going
to file a bankruptcy case on credit when somebody is about to get a three or
116. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. The other one of us was skeptical about this
hypothesis, speculating that the March peak had more to do with debtors making resolutions to deal
with their financial problems in the new year.
117. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 9 (attributing “spiking” filings in
February and March to tax returns).
Figure 5. 2004 Chapter 7 Filings (Percent by Month of Year)
Source: Authors’ calculations from PACER filing data
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four thousand dollar tax refund.”118 Another attorney explained that “in my
practice there used to be a peak in the spring[,] and it was the attorney’s fees
issue and . . . people getting their tax refunds . . . . [T]hen they would come in
and pay for the bankruptcy fee.”119 This tax refund effect reaches back several
months, shaping the pattern of filings over nearly the entire year in some
instances.120
We explored the possibility that the frequency of refunds suggested that a
large share of the filers were sufficiently impoverished to be receiving earned
income credits but were assured that these were more the kinds of “middle
class” filers that “use [the tax withholding system] as a savings account.”121
Thus, although the pace of intake of potential filers is relatively steady through-
out the year, the annualized pattern shows a pronounced upward trend through
the first quarter.122
Notably, the effects of tax refunds (and paychecks, discussed below) depend
substantially on the Chapter of filing. As an initial matter, we observe that
118. Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 5; see also Interview with Iowa
Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 80, at 5 (“Tax refund is my primary guess . . . .”); Telephone
Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 1 (attorney asked why tax refunds
might be relevant explained that “[t]hey have the money to pay me!”); Telephone Interview with Tex.
Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 3 (“[I]t may be driven a lot by tax refunds coming in from
January through April and May[,] and . . . they have that extra income[,] and they are able to pay their
filing fees and lawyer.”). As a related point, a debtor that filed just before the tax refund arrived would
risk losing the tax refund to general creditors if it were determined not to be an exempt asset. This
arguably darker side to the timing question also encourages filers to wait until after the refund has
arrived. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 5; see also Interview with
Iowa Chapter 7 Trustee, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining offhand that “I would think the people that are
going to file in March probably have got their refunds back. They file with . . . the easy tax return and
get the refunds back right away, spend it, and then file bankruptcy.”); Interview with Nev. Chapter 13
Trustee, supra note 65, at 26–27 (expressing concerns that the trustee will “take” the tax refund if
debtors file before they receive it).
119. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 4.
120. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Three 7 (Aug. 6, 2008) (stating that her practice is
to mention potential tax refunds in consultations in October or thereafter); Telephone Interview with
Iowa Consumer Attorney Four, supra note 76, at 15 (reflecting on how trustees’ interest in tax refund
“gets earlier every year” and now begins in September); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer
Attorney Two, supra note 72, at 2 (suggesting that trustees watch for incoming tax refunds in Chapter
13 cases filed as early as September 15); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three,
supra note 63, at 7 (“And we will bring up the issue of the tax refund and say, ‘In X weeks, you
normally get a tax refund, how much you expecting this year?’ Well let’s go out with that[,] and let’s
plan on putting that towards your attorney’s fees . . . .”).
121. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 5; see also Telephone
Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 1–2 (criticizing the “interest-free
loan to the government” resulting from “intentional overwithholding so that there is a forced savings”);
Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 3 (suggesting that people use
overwithholding as a “poor man’s saving account” and that earned income credits are not relevant). For
a general discussion of this pattern of behavior, see Michael S. Barr & Jane Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax
Withholding and Asset Allocation Among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers (Univ. of Mich. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 100, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract997866.
122. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 6 (suggesting an upward
trend during the first months of the year, though fairly constant on a quarter-by-quarter basis).
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attorney’s fees for Chapter 13 filings are much more easily deferred than for
Chapter 7 filings, which are for the most part incurred up front.123 The result is
that the need to save up for bankruptcy is less pronounced for Chapter 13
filings.124 Another major effect is the relationship between paying the bank-
ruptcy fees and the need to file quickly. As noted above, a much higher
proportion of Chapter 13 filings are emergency filings than is the case with
Chapter 7 filings. Such cases will serve their main purpose of avoiding a fore-
closure sale only if filed promptly. Though delaying bankruptcy to use a tax
refund is less plausible for homeowners, another causal force pushes a decline
in Chapter 13 filings before and during the holiday season. Several people told
us that the Christmas holiday deferred foreclosures in advance of December
either because creditors feared negative publicity or because judges refused or
were reluctant to evict homeowners in December.125
To be sure, there were some who credited the hypothesis of overspending at
Christmas, including one judge who suggested that the pattern “may have more
to do with just the way the bills come in after Christmas.”126 Similarly, one U.S.
123. In Chapter 13, debtors may pay their attorneys some or all of their fees through their repayment
plans. Local practice, even within a jurisdiction, varies as to the amount of the initial retainer fee that
attorneys require consumers to pay up-front before filing. See Telephone Interview with Ga. Trustee
Two, supra note 65, at 5 (“And in most of the cases that we see, I don’t see any payment of attorney’s
fees at all on the front of the case.”).
124. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 7; Telephone Interview
with Mass. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 3; Telephone Interview with N.J. Debtor
Attorney, supra note 63, at 8; Telephone Interview with Tex. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 92, at 3.
But see Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 94, at 6 (requiring roughly
half of fees up-front for Chapter 13, which is twice as expensive as the fees for Chapter 7, amounting to
roughly the same payment for both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and thus accruing no savings either way).
125. Foreclosure extinguishes a debtor’s ownership of the property, but unless a homeowner moves
out voluntarily, an eviction action is necessary to obtain possession of the home. Because of liability
concerns or fear of damage to an empty home, creditors prefer to evict immediately after foreclosure.
Thus, a desire to avoid December evictions translates into a slow-down in foreclosure starts several
weeks prior. See Interview with Nev. Chapter 13 Staff Attorney, supra note 88, at 4 (reporting that when
she handled foreclosure cases in private practice, her clients would not refer foreclosures to her between
the middle of November and the first week of the year); Telephone Interview with Ga. Bankruptcy
Judge, supra note 65, at 10 (“[E]verybody kind of almost knows don’t come in . . . asking for relief
from the stay [to foreclose] in January and December.”); Telephone Interview with Ga. Creditor
Attorney One, supra note 56, at 7 (noting that firm refrained from foreclosing in November or De-
cember unless Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac foreclosure timeline guidelines mandated immediate action).
Indeed, one attorney explained a peak in his state’s Chapter 13 filings in September and October as a
result of lenders working to close out delinquent mortgages before such a moratorium. See Telephone
Interview with Ga. Trustee Two, supra note 65, at 2.
126. Telephone Interview with Tex. Bankruptcy Judge One 3 (Sept. 21, 2007); see also Telephone
Interview with Ga. Trustee 2, supra note 65, at 7 (suggesting that high-volume filers are more likely to
attract clients through advertising, especially on television); Telephone Interview with N.J. Debtor
Attorney, supra note 63, at 2 (same); Telephone Interview with Tex. Bankruptcy Judge Two, supra note 64, at 6
(“I think the filings are higher in January, February, and March in Chapter 7 because people have gone nuts
with their credit cards for Christmas gifts[,] and then they start getting their bills in January and February . . . .”).
Some (but certainly not all) of those who took this perspective made it clear that they were not speaking from
personal experience but instead were simply hypothesizing about possible explanations for the pattern. See,
e.g., Telephone Interview with Tex. Bankruptcy Judge Two, supra note 64, at 6; Interview with Iowa Chapter
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Trustee attributed the early year peak following low December filings to a “psycho-
logical issue” that makes people unwilling to face their problems in December but
willing to come to grips with them after the turn of the new year.127 Most of those
who offered this explanation did not represent debtors and thus might be relying more
on speculation than on concrete knowledge of debtor motivations. Many debtors’
attorneys were skeptical of this explanation. For example, when asked if the holiday
overspending hypothesis rang true, one attorney explained:
No, not at all. I look at it as having the resources to pay me. I know that
[overspending] is an easy suspicion to reach, but I do not see that as affecting
the timing of the bankruptcy. It is just a matter of when the cash is available to
pay the lawyer.128
In the end, our data cannot exclude the post-Christmas possibility, and presum-
ably it is important in some cases. On balance, however, the tax refund ex-
planation seems to us the dominant explanation for the Chapter 7 pattern.129 In
the main, bankruptcy filings occur when a consumer can afford to pay an
attorney.130
13 Staff Attorney 9 (Sept. 24, 2007) (suggesting that overspending at Christmas would explain such a pat-
tern but noting that she had never seen such a pattern in her practice); Telephone Interview with Mass.
Consumer Attorney Four, supra note 110, at 2 (“I can opine only from speculation not from study but by
inclination it was people [who] have maybe gone on spending sprees before Christmas, they get the bills from
their credit card companies . . . come January or February, and they realize they don’t have even enough money
to be able to make their minimum payments on the credit cards.”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Chapter 13
Trustee, supra note 92, at 4 (stating that her office “ha[s] always noticed this trend” and that “post-Christmas
filings” is the only explanation that has occurred to them); Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra
note 80, at 5 (suggesting possibility of Christmas overspending after stating that tax refunds is her “primary”
guess).
127. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 5 (“We have also got in our
culture, I think, the sense that January is a time to re-evaluate and change what is wrong in your lives
and such[,] and so generally I see an uptake in the interest coming in those first couple of months just
like any health club would see a lot of new people signing up.”); Telephone Interview with Mass.
Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 77, at 3; Telephone Interview with Mass. U.S. Trustee 3 (Sept. 26 &
Oct. 16, 2007).
128. Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 64, at 2.
129. Consumer attorneys postulated a number of other theories for the phenomenon. These include
the debtor’s expectation that things will change for the better with the turn of the new year, see
Telephone Interview with Mass. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 105, at 3, or that people simply
do not want to think about bankruptcy during the holiday season, see Telephone Interview with Mass.
Consumer Attorney One, supra note 94, at 2. Finally one interview subject also pointed to seasonal
employment patterns, such as construction workers who are typically laid off during winter months. See
Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 80, at 5.
130. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 120, at 16 (explaining that delay
in filing after attorney consultation results from consumers “just trying to scrape [the money] up” and
that many people must “just save up” to find the money to file for bankruptcy).
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B. THE PAYCHECK EFFECT AND THE MONTHLY PATTERN
The other filing patterns are not as provocative or uniform across the states
we have studied, but they provide further support for the basic hypothesis of
this Part: a substantial part of the etiology of bankruptcies lies in the period of
time between the consultation with the attorney and the moment of filing. In
that vein, the second of the puzzles is why bankruptcy filings often exhibit a
two-peaked pattern when analyzed by day of the month, with high points
shortly after the first and fifteenth days of the month. Figure 6 illustrates the
pattern for Chapter 7 filings from Texas and Georgia, the states where the
pattern is most pronounced.
As discussed above, we started our interviews with the hypothesis that (at
least in Texas and Georgia) foreclosure filings would justify a spike shortly after
the first day of the month, but we had no explanation for why there would be a
similar spike fourteen days before the end of the month. Our interviews offered
a common explanation for that pattern. Generally, they suggested, clients come
to the offices “pretty steadily,”132 but the need to pay attorney’s fees and filing
costs drives the precise time of filing because the clients are waiting until “the
paycheck comes in[,] and so they pay the attorney[,] and then they file the
case . . . .”133 Indeed, subjects in Nevada and Iowa suggested that a similar
131. On the horizontal axis, Day 1 is the first day of a calendar month, with negative numbers
representing the days before the first day of a month.
132. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 4–5; see also Interview with Iowa
Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 5 (“I think that the interest level is fairly constant through
the year. I think that the timing of bankruptcies is largely affected by the tax refund issue.”).
133. Telephone Interview with Tex. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 92, at 4; see also Interview with
Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 4; Telephone Interview with Mass. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note
Figure 6. 2004 Chapter 7 Filings (Percent by Day of Month)
(Georgia and Texas)131
Source: Authors’ calculations from PACER filing data
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pattern does not appear in their states because so many employers pay on a
weekly basis that a semimonthly pattern would be irrelevant.134
C. THE MEANS TEST EFFECT AND THE MONTHLY PATTERN
Yet another monthly pattern relates to the income and expense means test for
Chapter 7 eligibility and its paperwork burdens.
When we conducted interviews in 2007 (at a time when we had data only for
2004), several attorneys told us that they had observed a pattern in which a large
share of Chapter 7 filings appeared immediately before the end of the month,
largely because of the cost and time consumed in recalculating the means test
and gathering new payment advices for the bankruptcy filing when the expected
filing date shifts to a later month.135 Because this effect depended on the means
test filing requirements imposed by BAPCPA in 2005,136 it was not surprising
that it did not appear in our 2004 data. As Figure 7 shows, the effect is quite
obvious in the 2007 data available to us now. In each of our five states, the last
day of the month is the peak day for Chapter 7 filings. Although very few
debtors fail the means test, its requirements are reshaping the patterns of filings.
The hurdles and paperwork that the means test imposes influence the moment at
which debtors file for bankruptcy, but the effect works in two directions. On the
one hand, debtors may defer their filings for additional time because they must
save up to pay higher attorney’s fees and locate additional paperwork. On the
other hand, BAPCPA creates an informal deadline for filing, incentivizing
77, at 3; Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 3 (attributing the
timing to “people get[ting] paid a lot on the 1st or the 15th”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer
Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 2 (suggesting that filers “get a paycheck and they go see their lawyer
and either the petition is ready to go and they file them on the 15th or 16th or the lawyer does not start
until they pay and then it takes two or three days to get everything in”). As with tax refunds, there is
also the related concern that a filing just before the arrival of the paycheck will result in loss of the
paycheck to the general creditors of the estate. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra
note 80, at 4 (“I try to file them when they are owed the least amount of wages either right after they
have been paid or the week following . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney One,
supra note 64, at 3 (suggesting that “it behooves us best [to file] when there’s no money in the bank,
and it’s not that you yank out money, it’s just that you’re very careful about the moment you file”);
Telephone Interview with Tex. Bankruptcy Judge One, supra note 126, at 2 (“[Y]ou curb the time of the
filing so that it’s right at the point when they get the paycheck and they can pay the bills and they can
buy the groceries and they don’t have to worry about reporting that income to the trustee[,] but at the
same time they can spend it so that they get a bit of a cushion.”). A reasonable perspective is that filers
often are influenced both by the desire to protect the paycheck and by the need to pay their attorney. See
Interview with Iowa Chapter 7 Trustee, supra note 63, at 2–3.
134. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 1; Interview with Nev.
Chapter 13 Staff Attorney, supra note 88, at 3.
135. Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 2–3; Telephone Interview with
Mass. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 94, at 9–10.
136. The 2005 reforms of the bankruptcy law added the requirement of payment advices to the other
paperwork that a debtor must file, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), (f) (2006) (requiring payment
advices and tax returns, respectively), and resulted in an additional form for computation of the means
test that is a required component of a bankruptcy filing, see Official Bankruptcy Form B 22C, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_08_Official/B_022C_0108v2.pdf.
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consumers to file before the end of a month to avoid wasted efforts and
additional expenses. Perhaps some of these consumers would have delayed their
bankruptcies for additional weeks or months if the need to recalculate monthly
paperwork did not loom.
D. ATTORNEY WORKLOAD AND THE WEEKLY PATTERN
A final set of patterns are evident at the weekly level. These patterns varied
considerably by state. For example, Wednesday was the peak day for filings in
Nevada,138 while Mondays and Fridays were dominant in Texas, as illustrated
in Figure 8. The high share of Texas filings on Mondays likely reflects the fore-
closure procedure that leads to a pronounced peak of filings on one particular
Monday of each month. There was no obvious reason, however, why Friday
filings should be so much higher than Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday filings.
Our interview subjects consistently explained that the particular day of the
week for filing a bankruptcy was both a matter of a particular attorney’s practice
and an issue of convenience for debtors. A Texas consumer bankruptcy attorney
noted that Friday may be a common day for filings because “it is easier for the
people to get off work on a Friday.”139 An Iowa Chapter 7 trustee explained that
137. On the horizontal axis, Day 1 is the first day of a calendar month, with negative numbers
representing the days before the first day of a month.
138. One of our subjects attributed the state’s filing patterns to a sharp drop in filings on Tuesday
and Thursday when the courts commonly have day-long calendars of consumer matters so that
attorneys are busy in court on those days and concentrate their filings on Monday, Wednesday, Friday,
and Saturday. See Interview with Nev. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 65, at 11–12.
139. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 1.
Figure 7. 2007 Chapter 7 Filings (Percent by Day of Month)137
Source: Authors’ calculations from AACER filing data
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many attorneys “clump” their filings on a particular day in response to the sched-
uling of creditors’ meetings. She explained that “there is nothing worse than
being a debtor’s filer and having to go to meetings . . . four different days a
week for four different trustees.”140 Typically, all cases filed on a particular day
are assigned the same calendar day for meetings of creditors.141 In the most
extreme circumstance that we documented, a high-volume debtors’ firm files its
Chapter 7 cases on only two days each month so that meetings of creditors for
its clients are scheduled together.142 Attorney workload issues may also influ-
ence filing patterns. Some suggested that firms build up cases over the weekend,
filing on Sunday night or Monday.143 The ability to file cases electronically also
may smooth filings over the week, permitting bankruptcy professionals to file at
their convenience around the clock.
140. Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 80, at 3; see also Telephone Interview
with Tex. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 92, at 2 (“[B]ecause of the way 341 meetings [of creditors] are
set in this jurisdiction, I think they definitely group them together and file them so they can sit one
afternoon at 341 meetings instead of several afternoons . . . . In a way, they save their workflow . . . .”).
141. See Telephone Interview with Tex. Bankruptcy Judge One, supra note 126, at 2; Telephone Interview
with Tex. Bankruptcy Judge Two, supra note 64, at 3; Telephone Interview with Tex. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra
note 92, at 2; Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 2.
142. See Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 4 (“[W]e hold
all of our Chapter 7s and file them at once and we do that twice a month. And so we pick a day towards
the beginning of the month and then a day in the middle of the month[,] and the reason we do that is
because when you file the case, the court automatically schedules their creditors meeting[,] and so if
you just file them as you sign the people up, you are at court every day. So we batch them[,] and I think
a lot of other firms do that as well.”).
143. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 80, at 2; see also Interview with
Iowa Chapter 7 Trustee, supra note 63, at 2 (stating that filings may go up on Mondays because of
attorneys working on Saturdays and Sundays, building up filings for the first day of the work week).
Figure 8. 2004 Total Filings (Percentages by Day of Week) (Texas)
Source: Authors’ calculations from PACER data
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The crucial point for our project was that the variance in filings over a week
did not reflect legal factors or collection pressures. Individual attorney prefer-
ence and issues of caseload management are the key determinants of the
particular day of a bankruptcy filing. These data are additional modest evidence
that bankruptcy filings reflect a complex interaction between debtors and attor-
neys rather than a linear effect from immediate creditor pressure driving a
debtor straight to bankruptcy.
More generally, the variances in weekly, monthly, and annual filing patterns
across states are difficult to square with an important role for emergency-driven
bankruptcy filings. Given that collection remedies, such as the filing of a lawsuit
or the repossession of a car, can occur on any day at a creditor’s whim,
bankruptcies driven by such events should be distributed evenly through a week
or month. During the debates leading up to the passage of BAPCPA, many
consumer advocates expressed concern that prerequisites to filing, such as
prebankruptcy credit counseling, would be significant barriers to consumers
seeking bankruptcy relief.144 The fear was that consumers would not contact an
attorney far enough in advance before a final collection activity.145 The data
presented here suggest that the problem was, and perhaps continues to be,
overstated.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As we discuss in Part I, our model emphasizes bankruptcy as an element of a
social system for alleviating the costs of financial distress; the role of bank-
ruptcy in that system is to facilitate the redeployment of human capital that
otherwise would be wasted. Viewed through that lens, even the preliminary
discussion above illuminates two interrelated sets of policy issues: (1) how to
regulate collection activities in a coherent and principled way and (2) how to
manage the financial costs and bureaucratic hurdles that impede bankruptcy
relief.
To explore these implications, we develop a crude taxonomy of collection
activity as falling into three stages: communicating the obligation to the cus-
tomer (“billing”); subsequent contacts to persuade the customer to repay (“dun-
ning”); and the pursuit of forcible legal remedies (“litigation”). The analysis in
144. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part II): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 205 (1999) (statement of
Henry E. Hildebrand, III, Chapter 13 Trustee, National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees) (stating that
by the time individuals seek bankruptcy protection, it is too late for client counseling); id. at 134–35
(statement of Wayne Sigmon, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys) (noting the
significant burdens that client counseling will have on debtors who file under “exigent circumstances”);
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 34
(2001) (opining that the credit counseling requirement would be both a “hassle and expensive”).
145. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 23 (1999) (Joan Ent-
macher, Vice-President and Director, Family Economic Center, National Women’s Law Center) (discuss-
ing how unsophisticated debtors may wait until the “sheriff is at the door” before seeking help).
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the preceding Parts of the Article suggests that in practice it is the “dunning”
stage of collection that is important in the etiology of bankruptcy filings.146 This
is troubling to us, primarily because the social value of that activity is ambigu-
ous at best. To understand the point, assume (with apologies for the stylized
simplicity) that there are two kinds of debtors—those who can and those who
cannot repay their debts. Among those who can pay, some wish to pay and some
do not. Billing will produce payment from those who wish to and can pay but
will have little or no effect on those who do not wish to or cannot pay.
Subsequent communications, however, may generate relatively little in the way
of repayment. Those who cannot pay of course will not pay. Nor is it clear that
subsequent communications will bring payment from those who can pay but do
not wish to pay.147
Litigation, by contrast, is well suited for sorting those who can pay from
those who cannot because those who can pay might be forced to pay through
litigation, while those who in truth cannot pay will not be forced to pay even in
response to litigation.
That framework suggests that once the debtor understands the nature of the
obligation and has decided not to pay it, subsequent dunning is a net social
loss—it wastes the resources of those who are fruitlessly attempting to collect
and diminishes the well-being of those who endure it. This outcome might
trouble us little when the dunning falls on debtors who simply do not wish to
pay. But when it falls on those who cannot pay, the activity seems to be a clear
social loss. The distinction from litigation (which we view quite differently)
illustrates our point. Because litigation imposes a substantial out-of-pocket cost
on the creditor, the rational creditor will engage in litigation only if there is
reason to believe that the debtor has assets from which payments can be made.
It is for this reason that sophisticated debt collectors often do initiate litigation
and so rarely experience bankruptcy filings as an immediate response. In sum,
in contrast to dunning (which on the margin is close to costless, especially in the
era of automated bucket shops148), the creditor’s decision to litigate is likely to
match the social costs and benefits of the activity much more closely.149 To put
it another way, dunning activity involves an asymmetric application of force;
146. The discussion below takes the view that this part of the collection process is for the most part
socially wasteful. Our view is not driven primarily by fear of egregious or outrageous collection, which
the law already bans. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2006) (giving nonexclusive list of unacceptable collection
practices). The effect that troubles us is cumulative and arises without malicious behavior from any
creditor.
147. To be sure, if the subsequent communications are sufficiently harassing, they might overcome a
weak desire not to pay. That effect, presumably, is one of the principal reasons for the communications.
148. The use of large, technologically integrated call centers (“bucket shops”) for collection activity
seems to be an unintended consequence of the do-not-call regulation, which limits the use of those
facilities for affirmative marketing. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), (f)(12) (2008) (forbidding companies
from making telephone calls with the purpose of encouraging purchase, rental, or investment of goods
or services to consumers who are on the do-not-call list).
149. See Telephone Interview with National Collection Attorney 10–14 (May 22, 2008) (discussing
the level of expected recovery necessary to justify litigation and the rarity of bankruptcy responses).
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the costs experienced by the debtor who receives numerous calls from creditors
are likely to be much higher than the costs incurred by the creditors. This
vitiates any sense that creditors are best placed to determine whether collection
activities are socially worthwhile because they bear the costs of engaging in
them and balance those costs against the anticipated benefits of future repay-
ment.
A second problem, which we regard as more speculative, is the possibility
that creditors face a collective-action problem because each creditor knows little
about the collection efforts any particular individual debtor is facing. Creditors
each have an individual incentive to move more rapidly than their peers to
ensure that whatever assets a debtor may possess are used to repay their own
institutions rather than their peers’. “If you sleep on your rights, then you
lose.”150 It may well be rational for each individual credit card lender to call a
borrower once each week, while it might not be rational for each of five lenders
to call the same borrower each week.151 And the experience of dunning from
one credit card call each day will be quite different than the experience from
one call each week.152 We acknowledge that the evidence of a collective action
problem here is relatively weak. To be sure, the anecdote resonates with our
sense that individual creditors, even highly sophisticated creditors, will know
relatively little about the collection efforts of their competitors. Of course, the
most sophisticated collectors will dial into their collection models the effects of
their competitors’ likely collection efforts, but not all creditors will be as
sophisticated as Capital One.153 Information about the financial position of a
particular debtor, or even about how (or when) to contact the debtor success-
fully, is valuable information, acquired at a cost, not readily to be shared with
competitors. Moreover, especially for less sophisticated creditors, the path of
collection activity often rests on client preferences rather than qualities of the
debtor, suggesting to us that creditors will pursue strategies that are contrary to
each other’s interests.154
150. Id. at 5.
151. The problem here is no different in conceptual structure than the collective action problem
identified by Thomas Jackson a generation ago in his analysis of the hypothetical creditor’s bargain.
See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 860–61 (1982).
152. See Telephone Interview with National Credit Card Executive, supra note 55, at 7–8 (describ-
ing the increasing levels of intensity with which creditors contact debtors while trying to avoid
counterproductive results).
153. The scenes in MAXED OUT: HARD TIMES, EASY CREDIT AND THE ERA OF PREDATORY LENDERS
(Trueworks 2006) on this subject are informative.
154. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney Two, supra note 55, at 6 (“For each
[creditor] . . . it’s almost like it’s kind of a different bucket if you will.”); Telephone Interview with
Mass. Chapter 13 Trustee, supra note 77, at 7 (“[P]er my experience in representing Chapter 7 [clients,]
I think the pressure is that if you have one credit card company pushing you, you can further make a
deal to pay those people $25 a week payments, though when you have three, and four, and five
pressuring you then it just becomes overwhelming . . . .”).
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In the current system, dunning forces debtors to seek refuge in bankruptcy.
As a practical matter, debtors might seek relief in bankruptcy because the relief
from dunning provided by bankruptcy exceeds the direct (financial) and indirect
(psychological, stigma, and humiliation) costs of bankruptcy. Notice that in this
model, debtors are filing for bankruptcy even in cases in which they gain no
economic benefit—a rational judgment-proof debtor would file for bankruptcy
simply to avoid dunning.155 As a matter of system design, that makes perfect
sense as long as we believe that the balance between dunning and psychological
costs matches the social balance between the debts discharged by the bank-
ruptcy and the future value to be gained by the redeployment of the debtor’s
human capital.
But the debtor’s patience for tolerating collection pressure is at best a remote
proxy for the social costs and benefits of bankruptcy. This is particularly true if,
as discussed above, the costs of dunning borne by creditors are so much lower
than the wider social costs, meaning we should expect excessive dunning even
from well-intentioned creditors. We would prefer a system that distinguishes,
roughly speaking, between those who are in “irretrievable” distress and those
who are in “episodic” distress.156 Recognizing that observers with different
normative baselines would categorize different debtors in different ways, for us
the paradigmatic case of “episodic” distress would be the household that is in a
stable financial position but because of a substantial exogenous shock (divorce,
layoff, injury, illness, etc.) ceases making payments to creditors. Such a family,
given time to recover, might be able to resume payments within a short time
frame, eventually repay all of its obligations, and return to normal social pro-
ductivity. The paradigmatic case of “irretrievable” distress would be the house-
hold suffering from a level of debt so far in excess of the household’s expected
income that there is no reasonable prospect of repayment in the foreseeable
future. Putting concerns about moral hazard to the side,157 society gains if that
155. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 21 (explaining that people without any
assets that creditors can reach file for bankruptcy because the other strategies do not “end the debt,” and
the constant burden of debt “destroys families,” is “very corrosive,” and just “keeps getting bigger and
bigger”).
156. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney Two, supra note 55, at 10–11 (distinguish-
ing between debtors whose financial setbacks were temporary and eventually can pay and those who
have permanent circumstances with no solution other than bankruptcy).
157. Again, different observers will have different perspectives on the moral hazard inherent in the
bankruptcy process. It has been the experience of the authors, however, that the bankruptcy process
(including, among other things, the meeting of creditors with its attendant questioning by the bank-
ruptcy trustee) is sufficiently humiliating to render moral hazard a relatively unimportant element of
sensible system design. See Thorne & Anderson, supra note 62, at 93–94 (discussing the shame,
humiliation, and stigma associated with filing bankruptcy for most consumers). This is not to say that
debtors do not act strategically in deciding when to file. We do think, however, that the long period of
struggle (one to two years or more) that we document before households file for bankruptcy suggests
that concerns about bankruptcies of convenience are overstated. See Mann, supra note 35, at 376–77
(discussing the legislative history of BAPCPA and the concerns expressed therein about bankruptcies of
convenience). We also note that debtors threaten bankruptcy repeatedly before they actually file, and
many are deterred from ever filing. See Telephone Interview with Iowa Creditor Attorney Two, supra
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family files promptly for bankruptcy, discharges its debts immediately, and
returns to the ranks of productivity.158 Until the irretrievably distressed family
files for bankruptcy, it has a starkly diminished incentive to engage in produc-
tive economic activity because the future returns of such activity will accrue
disproportionately for the benefit of creditors. For the family in episodic dis-
tress, however, the situation is much more ambiguous. Society loses if, in the
current system, the “drum beat” of dunning presses that family into a bank-
ruptcy that a brief respite from pressure might avoid.159
The adverse effects of the “drum beat” on debtor behavior are evident from a
fascinating phenomenon revealed by our interviews, which we call the “$300
bankruptcy.” Particularly after BAPCPA raised the out-of-pocket costs for
bankruptcy filings,160 a number of debtors have taken to retaining a bankruptcy
lawyer, making a down payment in the range of $300 toward the full cost of
attorney’s fees for a bankruptcy filing.161 Those who make these initial pay-
ments often never return and in other cases often wait several months before
note 55, at 7 (saying that so many consumers threaten bankruptcy when he speaks to them to collect
debts that to him “[i]t’s the same as saying hello to me” but reporting that most people who threaten
bankruptcy “won’t do it”).
158. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 18 (suggesting that people
in financial distress who do not file for bankruptcy go into an “underground economy”). As one of us
has previously discussed, it is a challenging task to identify the optimal moment for bankruptcy. See
Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67,
121 (2006).
159. Arthur Leff offered a similar insight forty years ago about the collection process. As he
elegantly framed it, the creditor’s critical question is, “[D]o I coerce or cooperate?” He elaborated:
To coerce the helpless is to waste money and effort; to cooperate with the deadbeat is to risk
total loss. If, in fact, the majority of D[ebtor]s, especially consumer D[ebtor]s . . . are in the
can’t-pay category, then any method which takes collection out of a coercive mode (judicial
coerive [sic] or informational-coercive) and into a cooperative model (where more time is
given, earning potential is not interfered with and asset values are not destroyed) is likely to
enhance the efficiency of the whole collection system, and benefit both C[reditor]s and
D[ebtor]s.
Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1,
37 (1970).
160. Although the increase of fees after BAPCPA is widely asserted anecdotally (frequently in our
interviews), there is little quantitative data on the subject. For a recent examination of the question, see
generally Robert M. Lawless & Heather A. Miller, The Rising Cost of Going Broke (2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors).
161. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 120, at 4, 14. Although other
attorneys did not conceptualize it as an explicit alternative to bankruptcy, several practitioners spread
throughout our jurisdictions of inquiry told us that they allow consumers to refer creditors to them
during the period after an initial fee payment and noted that many people seemed content with such a
service, delaying filing bankruptcy for a long period or never filing at all. See Telephone Interview with
Ga. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 9 (explaining that when a consumer makes a partial
payment toward bankruptcy attorney fees, they begin taking collection calls and continue for up to
ninety days without further payments); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney Two, supra
note 72, at 10–11 (“I give them my card[,] and I just say, okay, you . . . turn all the creditors over to
us.”); Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 8–9 (offering
consumers who make an initial payment a “free” creditor referral number that consumers may give to
creditors while they consider whether to make a bankruptcy filing).
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returning to see the lawyer.162 The perspective of the lawyers is that the clients
are purchasing immunity from dunning because the debtor can direct all creditor
correspondence and phone calls to the attorney after the down payment on the
bankruptcy fee has been made.163 If the borrower’s affairs are repaired during
the breathing space from dunning (a case of episodic distress), the borrower
need never return to see the lawyer; if they cannot be repaired (irretrievable
distress), the borrower ultimately will return, pay the remainder of the attorney’s
fee, and seek relief in bankruptcy.
The phenomenon of the “$300 bankruptcy” reflects the two-sided nature of
the informational deficits that complicate determinations of can-pay/cannot-pay
status. The literature exhibits a single-minded focus on the ability of debtors to
shroud their capacity to pay and to deceive creditors and the concomitant
difficulty that creditors face in assessing a debtor’s capacity to repay.164 The
addition to bankruptcy of a “means test” as a tool to scrutinize capacity to repay
ostensibly reflects such concerns. Yet debtors themselves lack perfect informa-
tion about ability to repay because future income and expenses are unknown,
even to them.165 The extended time between an initial consultation with an
attorney and an ultimate bankruptcy filing permits consumers to consider their
financial options without dunning that might otherwise prompt an immediate
(and costly) bankruptcy. Such a lull strikes us as beneficial to all—creditors,
debtors, and society at large—because it facilitates the sorting of consumers
into categories of irretrievable distress (who ultimately file for bankruptcy) and
episodic distress (who recover their financial footing and try to repay their
debts).
If we take seriously the adverse effects that dunning has on the collection
process, and the collective-action problem that aggravates this process, it seems
appropriate to suggest a few simple extensions of existing limitations on col-
lection. First, the federal law regulating debt collection, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) should be extended so that its scope of coverage
162. See Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 72, at 2 (“I am taking
creditor phone calls for them. I have got files where I have had people who have seen me 18 months
ago and said[,] ‘[O]kay, I am ready to file,’ and I’m like[,] ‘[W]ho are you?’”).
163. It is a surprising testament to the general norm of compliance by creditors that this device
seems so effective from the perspective of borrowers. That is not to suggest that creditors do not find
this situation frustrating. See id. at 10–11 (“We have a mantra. It’s basically yes, we represent so and so,
we have no filing of data at this time, we have been fully retained, we cannot disclose any further
information. . . . And creditors will crab and they will say, ‘[W]ell you told us that 60 days ago, and we
will call this again in 60 days.’ I say fine, I’ll probably tell you the same damn thing.”).
164. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 10, at 218–21 (questioning the morality of allowing
can-pay debtors to escape repayment of their obligations). Even ignoring the moral hazard problem, it
is supposed that the creditor cannot obtain the necessary information to determine ability to repay. See
Rea, supra note 7, at 193 (arguing that although a debtor’s “income is determined exogenously and
depends on the state of the world,” the lender is unable to determine if income has fallen).
165. The information technology available to sophisticated creditors gives them a pronounced
informational advantage in assessing the likelihood that debtors will recover financial strength in the
future, even if we ignore the overlapping cognitive deficits that are likely to plague self-assessment of
that question.
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includes all collection activities, regardless of whether they are undertaken by
the creditors themselves or third-party collectors.166 Any profitable collection
activity that lawfully can be engaged in only by internal collectors will be
sourced to such collectors either through a sale of the debt to the collector or by
an assignment of the collection activity to a collector with an adequate relation-
ship to “count” as internal.167
Second, the negative effects of dunning prompt us to urge careful scrutiny of
the existing rules on dunning calls or other collection activity. Our findings from
this initial project lead us to believe that current law is not sufficiently forceful
in curbing activity that is socially harmful. At a comprehensive level, the
improved technology available to creditors has driven down the costs of collec-
tion and increased the number and intensity of collection efforts.168 Consumers
are likely to face more consistent and sophisticated pressure to pay than in the
past; the dunning stage of collection activity (as opposed to litigation activity
such as garnishment or executions) seems to have significant force. Put another
way, the “beating drums” of today’s collection efforts may play at a louder
volume than the static of yesteryear. Consumers may be unable to withstand a
sufficient period of dunning activity to permit an optimal assessment of the
likelihood that they can repay the debts.
One approach is for the law to provide the breathing room of bankruptcy’s
automatic stay—or the deflection from creditor dunning of the $300 bankruptcy—
without an actual bankruptcy filing. In the following paragraphs, we devel-
op a proposal to halt collection activity modeled on the do-not-call list appli-
cable to telemarketing. As a preliminary matter, we note that such a proposal is
quite modest. At least in theory, current law169 already allows consumers to
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4), (6)(A) (1998) (excluding creditors collecting their own debts from the
definition of a “debt collector”).
167. The problem is exacerbated by language in the FDCPA that employs a lax standard for
determining whether independent contractors can be treated as internal collectors. See id. § 1692a(6)(A)
(excluding “any officer or employee of a creditor” from scope of the FDCPA); Pollice v. Nat’l Tax
Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that an assignee of debt is not generally
considered a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute if the obligation is not in default at the
time of the assignment).
168. Although there are no ready statistics on the scope of debt collection, it appears that consumers
perceive themselves to be suffering more pressure from collectors in recent years. According to a 2008
FTC report, more people file complaints against debt collection agencies than any other industry. See
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2008: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 4 (2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/P084802fdcpareport.pdf. The number of complaints has nearly tripled
from 2000 to 2007. See Phuong Cat Le, As Consumers Owe More, the Tactics Get Aggressive:
Complaints Mount About Debt Collectors, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 21, 2007, at A1, available
at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/328406_debt21.html. Indeed, new debt collection technology
allows debt collectors to profitably target debtors with smaller debts. See Anne Kadet, Who Profits Most
From Debt? Debt Collectors, SMARTMONEY, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/
debt/Who-Profits-Most-From-Debt-Debt-Collectors-20685/.
169. Although many states have statutes that supplement, and in some cases extend, the coverage of
the FDCPA, none of them include provisions responsive to the concerns that we address here. The most
common additional protection of state debt collection restrictions is their applicability to creditors
collecting their own debts rather than just third-party debt collectors. But though some states have such
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request that debt collectors cease communication.170 In practice, however,
the existing remedy lacks the global reach needed to halt the dunning. For
one thing, as noted above, the FDCPA applies only to a subset of creditors. But
the practical problems are much more important. The transaction costs of
having to contact debt collectors individually overwhelm the perceived value
of doing so, at least relative to the bankruptcy option as an alternative to halting
collection. Contacting each creditor would require a substantial amount of effort
because the median bankruptcy debtor has fourteen unsecured creditors.171
Most consumers are likely to be unaware of the FDCPA and learn of their
rights only upon consulting a bankruptcy attorney. In that context, they are
likely to weigh the expense and efficacy of contacting each creditor and telling
them to refrain from future contact against a global solution via bankruptcy in
which an automatic stay on collection is followed by a permanent discharge of
debt.172
In this regard, we note that most debtors’ attorneys have given up on
nonbankruptcy solutions to debt collection. One attorney described at length his
difficulty in trying to use the FDCPA:
I am almost never successful in getting anyone interested in doing that. I think
that when you offer clients an alternative that they can file for bankruptcy in a
fairly civil kind of arena where they are not likely to face a lot of intentional
shaming of them[,] . . . they clearly are not interested in a private right of
action. . . . You know[,] they are not litigious[,] and . . . the second thing is
that even though they will be postured as plaintiffs, they still see themselves
as the debtor[,] and it will still be shameful to them to go to court
a provision in their state “mini”-FDCPA (Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas), others do not (Nevada) or
impose other limitations on the scope of their debt collection law that ultimately does not expand the
scope of coverage beyond the FDCPA. See IOWA CODE § 527.7102 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
93, § 49 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 649.020 (2009); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.001 (Vernon 2009).
Georgia’s statute, for example, does not apply to banks, mortgage companies, pawnbrokers, and a host
of other entities and only applies to loans of $3000 or less. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-4, -6 (2009). No state
has a provision for a do-not-call system like the one that we suggest here.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
171. 2007 CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, COURT RECORDS Tally Unsecured Creditors Sch. F (2007) (on
file with Ronald J. Mann) (n  2393). Even if a debtor undertakes that work, it can be difficult to know
whether a request to a debt collector will result in the underlying creditor permanently ceasing
communication. See Telephone Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor, supra note 62, at 9–10 (explain-
ing that contacting one debt collector seeking a cessation of dunning calls is often ineffective because
the absence of payments often leads to the debt being recycled to a different debt collector not aware of
the previous request to stop calling).
172. See Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 18–19 (“[E]ven if the creditor had
violated the FDCPA I did not focus on that. That was a small item. . . . You know, they are in so
deep, they are under water already, so there is no sense in looking at that small violation if you
are going to drown in the bigger picture.”); Telephone Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor, supra
note 62, at 9 (describing how the agency advises clients to send cease-and-desist letters but needs to
“assure and reassure” debtors about that approach); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney
Two, supra note 72, at 8 (“Debtors just want to get the pressure off their backs. FDCPA takes a
while.”).
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and admit they owed a debt they did not pay and then to have the gall to
actually ask a judge to award them money for someone else’s behavior. I think
that is very hard for them to stomach.173
It is likely that at least some of this difficulty reflects the expertise of the
interview subject: bankruptcy lawyers and those who they counsel are more
likely to conclude that bankruptcy is the best remedy for their clients, while
those who specialize in the FDCPA are more likely to have conversations in
which the FDCPA seems the best remedy.174 Yet, there does seem to be a
difference between the debtors for whom the FDCPA standing alone can
provide effective relief and those for whom bankruptcy provides more effective
relief. Generally speaking, those who do FDCPA work think they can provide
adequate relief for consumers whose problems are centered on one or a small
number of abusive creditors. Consumers overwhelmed by a large number of
creditors are unlikely to find the FDCPA optimal, even if they seek advice from
an FDCPA specialist.175
The reluctance of debtors (and their attorneys) to use the FDCPA as a tool
perhaps could be eroded by increasing the penalty for an FDCPA violation.176
The $1,000 maximum for statutory damages was established over three decades
ago.177 Adjusting this amount for inflation is an obvious reform; it is more
difficult to pinpoint the optimal damage award. Several attorneys emphasized,
however, that the current cost-benefit balance deterred consumers from pursuing
even egregious FDCPA violations:
[E]ven if there are violations, I mean[,] what are your actual damages in most
of these cases[,] and there really aren’t any. . . . [C]lients don’t ever really
want to pursue those [FDCPA actions] if you actually explain to them that
there [are] not really any damages at the end of the day. . . . [S]o why do they
want to go through all that trouble if at the end of the day they do not get
173. Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney One, supra note 60, at 10–11; see also Interview with
Iowa Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 120, at 16. (“With the FDCPA, there is still [a] little bit of
shame[,] and I think that that shame is enough to say that I just don’t want to bother with it.”).
174. Telephone Interview with Wis. FDCPA Attorney 3–4 (May 27, 2009).
175. Interview with Iowa U.S. Trustee, supra note 63, at 19–20. One interesting data point about the
sophistication of the relevant consumer population is that the very general advertisements of the
FDCPA specialist whom we interviewed (mentioning “harassing debt collectors” but not bankruptcy)
for the most part produce clients who have only a small number of creditors; those with large numbers
of creditors apparently respond to advertisements that include the word “bankruptcy.” Telephone
Interview with Wis. FDCPA Attorney, supra note 174, at 4–5.
176. One possibility would be that if the FDCPA provided more robust relief, firms specializ-
ing in providing bankruptcy relief might be more motivated than they presently are to add FDCPA
specialists to their staff who could pursue statutory relief in cases in which it was appropriate, while pursuing
bankruptcy relief at the same time. See Telephone Interview with Wis. FDCPA Attorney, supra note 174, at
4–5.
177. Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813(a)(2)(A), 91 Stat. 874, 881 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A)).
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anything from it[,] and most of them say[,] “I don’t want, you know, I don’t
want the hassle. I just want it to stop.”178
A more innovative approach would be to offer consumers the equivalent
of a single-portal, do-not-dun list for halting all debt collection efforts. Creditors
would be obligated to honor such a request for a limited time, calibrated to
the perceived length of time needed for consumers to assess whether their
financial distress will be resolved. Drawing on the typical delay between
contacting an attorney and filing bankruptcy that we identified in this project,
we proffer six months as a suggested window of relief. The consumer would
activate this protective mechanism through a toll-free phone call or by visit-
ing an Internet site. As the above discussion of the limitations of the FDCPA
suggests, low transaction costs to entry are essential to the success of a
high-volume system aimed at ordinary consumers. Thus, we believe an adminis-
trative rather than judicial process is likely to be more effective. The success of
the do-not-call telemarketing list suggests that consumers would participate in a
do-not-dun system aimed at stemming fruitless collection activities.
To be sure, there is some chance that the termination of communication by
the debtor might result in a precipitate collection action.179 But the model
discussed above suggests that litigation is not socially harmful, primarily be-
cause the action is sufficiently costly to creditors to limit its use to cases in
which there is some reason to believe the debtor can pay. From this perspec-
tive, one virtue of the do-not-dun list would be that it would provide cred-
itors a low-cost signal that there is no need to wait to collect further information
to assess the debtor’s willingness to pay. If creditors wish to invest the resources
to proceed to litigation, our proposal would not hinder them in any way; it
would, however, provide an easy and effective way to terminate dunning—
immediately signaling the debtor will not pay voluntarily (at least for the time
being).
Finally, if the previous discussion is concerned about forcing debtors into
inappropriate bankruptcy filings because of dunning, the data suggest a parallel
concern about excessive costs deterring socially valuable bankruptcy filings.
The filing patterns presented in Part IV strongly suggest a group of debtors for
whom the decision to file bankruptcy is deferred due to a lack of funds. If we
think these debtors’ decisions are likely to be too hasty, then we should approve
178. Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney One, supra note 64, at 12; see also Inter-
view with Iowa Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 120, at 15 (“But they still think it is just too
much of a hassle for them to sue. And you know if the debt is only a couple of thousand dollars, then
for a lot of people they just don’t see that it’s worth the effort of some kind of a lawsuit. . . . I think raising the
statutory damages would help a lot.”); Telephone Interview with Nev. Consumer Attorney Two, supra note 72,
at 8 (suggesting that typical recovery of $1000 is not adequate motivation to justify FDCPA lawsuits because
“[d]ebtors just want to get the pressure off their backs” and FDCPA takes a while).
179. See Telephone Interview with National Collection Attorney, supra note 149, at 8–9 (collec-
tion attorney stating that he initiates litigation promptly after debtors ask for termination of communica-
tion).
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of a barrier that withholds bankruptcy relief until (or unless) it is appropriate.
Conversely, in cases in which bankruptcy relief is appropriate, the deferral of
the bankruptcy discharge pending the ability of the household to save the funds
necessary for a bankruptcy filing imposes social losses—both the loss of
redeployed human capital for productive use during the deferral period and the
social losses from a deeper and broader set of externalities due to the house-
hold’s continued financial distress.180 Within the framework of this Article—in
which bankruptcy relief is a social response to mitigate the costs of financial
distress—we might regard the filing fees for bankruptcy as the “co-pay” the
debtors must pay to take advantage of the service. Analogizing to the design of
health insurance, if society is suffering because the system is underused, we
might think that the level of the co-pay is too high.181 BAPCPA only worsened
this problem because the higher attorney’s fees extend the time necessary for a
consumer to save up for bankruptcy.182
Current law does a poor job of policing whether bankruptcy filings are too
hasty. Put another way, the law is largely unconcerned with excluding debtors
whose distress is episodic. Neither the “abuse” standard nor the means test
examines the underlying causes of financial distress and the likely trajectory of
recovery for the would-be bankruptcy debtor.183 The proper task is to identify
and deter from bankruptcy those in episodic distress without imposing undue
barriers to bankruptcy for those in irretrievable distress. Though it is beyond
this project (and perhaps these authors) to operationalize such a system,184 we
hope that our effort to direct further consumer bankruptcy scholarship to this
issue is itself a useful contribution.
The converse problem is that the current system appears to do a poor job of
giving prompt access to bankruptcy relief for those in irretrievable distress.185
180. Although the effects of severe financial distress have not been carefully documented, they
might include harms to the debtor’s children from household stress, postponement of preventative
medical care, or withdrawal of funds from retirement accounts that leave the consumer dependent on
public funds later in life. For example, a debtor’s financial distress may impair her ability to concentrate
on her job. See Telephone Interview with Tex. Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 63, at 10 (“And I
have actually had a few employers actually pay our attorney fees on behalf of their employees just
because of the interruption to productivity.”).
181. We thank Ed Morrison for suggesting the analogy.
182. See Interview with Iowa Consumer Attorney Three, supra note 120, at 23–24.
183. Indeed, the means test is explicitly backward-looking, relying on the inanely named “current
monthly income,” an average of the six months of income before the bankruptcy, to determine
going-forward ability to pay. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2007).
184. One possible system would provide an immediate discharge but then recapture excess income if
such funds materialized. See Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather
Than Means Testing: Using the Tax System to Collect from Can-Pay Consumer Debtors After Bank-
ruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 6.
185. The usefulness of nonbankruptcy alternatives disappears if people wait too long to seek help
with their debts. See Telephone Interview with Nev. Credit Counselor, supra note 62, at 10 (estimating
that because consumers “are waiting too long to find a solution to their problem[s],” less than a half
dozen people among the several thousand who completed prebankruptcy credit counseling with the
agency were viable candidates for debt management plans).
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Using the simple framework of the discussion above, we might think, at least
for those in irretrievable distress, that the appropriate response is a much simpler
system that will have much lower costs (both private and public). As one of us has
discussed elsewhere, the low-income, low-asset bankruptcy proposals that other coun-
tries are commonly adopting provide a useful model.186 The basic idea is that the
system should operate differently for people in irretrievable distress. With these
debtors having so little income and few assets, the model should be a streamlined
administrative proceeding with low fees for access and in which public expenses are
focused on vigilant efforts to detect and punish fraud.
The goal should be a simple one-page form that debtors could complete
without an attorney’s assistance. Although working out the precise details is
beyond the scope of this Article, a few preliminary thoughts should help to
illuminate the idea. If the purpose is to identify those debtors for whom a
streamlined administrative process is relevant, then it should include some
information about both income (which should be quite low) and debt (which
should be quite high as compared to income).187 Although it is harder to oper-
ationalize for routine use, it also would be important to have some inquiries,
perhaps with boxes to be checked, about the nature of the assets the debtor has.
If the purpose of the form is to forgo any administration of the bankruptcy
proceeding, it is important to be sure there is a low likelihood of assets for
distribution to creditors.188
To counter the problem of attorney’s fees as a deterrent to prompt bank-
ruptcy filings, the system could adopt a sliding-fee scale for attorney’s fees,
with much lower charges for debtors who have low incomes and low assets,
and consequently, are little affected by the means test or other complica-
tions.189 The current bankruptcy system deters attorneys from offering such
low-cost services because it requires significant paperwork and complex legal
counseling for all cases, even those filed by debtors without assets. The need to
promptly redeploy the human capital of those families is especially pressing
in this time of economic turmoil. Collectively, society loses when people are
trapped in financial distress, discouraged from productive economic enter-
prises and so burdened by debts that they cannot participate in the consumer
economy.
186. See Ronald J. Mann, A Comparative Analysis of Filing Rates and the Severity of Consumer
Bankruptcy Law, in CONSUMER CREDIT, OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND BANKRUPTCY: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL DIMENSIONS (J. Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. eds., 2009).
187. Presumably the simplified proceeding would not be available to borrowers who wish to retain
assets subject to secured debt, such as houses or cars.
188. Procedures for establishing eligibility for programs like Medicaid might provide a useful
analogy.
189. Bankruptcy courts must approve the fees that debtors pay attorneys, making this proposal
administratively feasible if the judges were persuaded it was a desirable reform.
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CONCLUSION
We emphasize the preliminary nature of the inquiry. What is important to us
about this Article is the questions we pose. Which institutions sort families in
distress into those who do and those who do not resort to bankruptcy? How do
those institutions affect which families use bankruptcy? And most importantly,
how do we want those institutions to work? We hope that the information and
analysis we present here demonstrate that those questions are important, intrigu-
ing, and unresolved.
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